kernel: mtd: parser: cmdline: Fix parsing of part-names with colons

Some devices (especially QCA ones) are already using hardcoded partition
names with colons in it. The OpenMesh A62 for example provides following
mtd relevant information via cmdline:

  root=31:11 mtdparts=spi0.0:256k(0:SBL1),128k(0:MIBIB),384k(0:QSEE),64k(0:CDT),64k(0:DDRPARAMS),64k(0:APPSBLENV),512k(0:APPSBL),64k(0:ART),64k(custom),64k(0:KEYS),0x002b0000(kernel),0x00c80000(rootfs),15552k(inactive) rootfsname=rootfs rootwait

The change to split only on the last colon between mtd-id and partitions
will cause newpart to see following string for the first partition:

  KEYS),0x002b0000(kernel),0x00c80000(rootfs),15552k(inactive)

Such a partition list cannot be parsed and thus the device fails to boot.

Avoid this behavior by making sure that the start of the first part-name
("(") will also be the last byte the mtd-id split algorithm is using for
its colon search.

Fixes: 5d01d05608 ("kernel: Update kernel 4.14 to version 4.14.202")
Fixes: edda06c7b4 ("kernel: Update kernel 4.9 to version 4.9.240")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
(backported from commit 223eec7e81)

feeds.conf.default

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-src-git packages https://git.openwrt.org/feed/packages.git^b0df5d33652220a384593d7b52a8453b022b8f9b
-src-git luci https://git.openwrt.org/project/luci.git^868abc1a564ca8366bbb018a967923cbdc5ee27a
-src-git routing https://git.openwrt.org/feed/routing.git^9fa2b249cc286176f07efe343fd9518b383462fc
-src-git telephony https://git.openwrt.org/feed/telephony.git^8ecbdabc7c5cadbe571eb947f5cd333a5a785010
+src-git packages https://git.openwrt.org/feed/packages.git;openwrt-18.06
+src-git luci https://git.openwrt.org/project/luci.git;openwrt-18.06
+src-git routing https://git.openwrt.org/feed/routing.git;openwrt-18.06
+src-git telephony https://git.openwrt.org/feed/telephony.git;openwrt-18.06

include/kernel-version.mk

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 
 LINUX_RELEASE?=1
 
-LINUX_VERSION-4.9 = .208
-LINUX_VERSION-4.14 = .162
+LINUX_VERSION-4.9 = .243
+LINUX_VERSION-4.14 = .206
 
-LINUX_KERNEL_HASH-4.9.208 = b7ad1c9841d671d026c55a4c91c77205f8b488ca5f980f838591c68662e0525a
-LINUX_KERNEL_HASH-4.14.162 = f65170224cd4359ce8b2793b492bd8127abdd0b91350484e001bce13f0c98b4b
+LINUX_KERNEL_HASH-4.9.243 = d3aa189ca7fcc6e52d6c0333a0d7acd8789e9a492b32dbf9476e926ffaa73984
+LINUX_KERNEL_HASH-4.14.206 = 1c233efaa5063983293a02d4692acc9ced9c03e18857364855d4f612347086ac
 
 remove_uri_prefix=$(subst git://,,$(subst http://,,$(subst https://,,$(1))))
 sanitize_uri=$(call qstrip,$(subst @,_,$(subst :,_,$(subst .,_,$(subst -,_,$(subst /,_,$(1)))))))

include/prereq-build.mk

@@ -28,16 +28,9 @@ $(eval $(call TestHostCommand,proper-umask, \
 
 $(eval $(call SetupHostCommand,gcc, \
 	Please install the GNU C Compiler (gcc) 4.8 or later, \
-	$(CC) -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?)', \
-	gcc -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?)', \
-	gcc48 --version | grep gcc, \
-	gcc49 --version | grep gcc, \
-	gcc5 --version | grep gcc, \
-	gcc6 --version | grep gcc, \
-	gcc7 --version | grep gcc, \
-	gcc8 --version | grep gcc, \
-	gcc9 --version | grep gcc, \
-	gcc --version | grep Apple.LLVM ))
+	$(CC) -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?|10\.?)', \
+	gcc -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?|10\.?)', \
+	gcc --version | grep -E 'Apple.(LLVM|clang)' ))
 
 $(eval $(call TestHostCommand,working-gcc, \
 	\nPlease reinstall the GNU C Compiler (4.8 or later) - \
@@ -47,16 +40,9 @@ $(eval $(call TestHostCommand,working-gcc, \
 
 $(eval $(call SetupHostCommand,g++, \
 	Please install the GNU C++ Compiler (g++) 4.8 or later, \
-	$(CXX) -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?)', \
-	g++ -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?)', \
-	g++48 --version | grep g++, \
-	g++49 --version | grep g++, \
-	g++5 --version | grep g++, \
-	g++6 --version | grep g++, \
-	g++7 --version | grep g++, \
-	g++8 --version | grep g++, \
-	g++9 --version | grep g++, \
-	g++ --version | grep Apple.LLVM ))
+	$(CXX) -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?|10\.?)', \
+	g++ -dumpversion | grep -E '^(4\.[8-9]|[5-9]\.?|10\.?)', \
+	g++ --version | grep -E 'Apple.(LLVM|clang)' ))
 
 $(eval $(call TestHostCommand,working-g++, \
 	\nPlease reinstall the GNU C++ Compiler (4.8 or later) - \

include/version.mk

@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@ PKG_CONFIG_DEPENDS += \
 sanitize = $(call tolower,$(subst _,-,$(subst $(space),-,$(1))))
 
 VERSION_NUMBER:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_NUMBER))
-VERSION_NUMBER:=$(if $(VERSION_NUMBER),$(VERSION_NUMBER),18.06.6)
+VERSION_NUMBER:=$(if $(VERSION_NUMBER),$(VERSION_NUMBER),18.06-SNAPSHOT)
 
 VERSION_CODE:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_CODE))
-VERSION_CODE:=$(if $(VERSION_CODE),$(VERSION_CODE),r7957-d81a8a3e29)
+VERSION_CODE:=$(if $(VERSION_CODE),$(VERSION_CODE),$(REVISION))
 
 VERSION_REPO:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_REPO))
-VERSION_REPO:=$(if $(VERSION_REPO),$(VERSION_REPO),http://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/18.06.6)
+VERSION_REPO:=$(if $(VERSION_REPO),$(VERSION_REPO),http://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/18.06-SNAPSHOT)
 
 VERSION_DIST:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_DIST))
 VERSION_DIST:=$(if $(VERSION_DIST),$(VERSION_DIST),OpenWrt)

package/base-files/image-config.in

@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ if VERSIONOPT
 	config VERSION_REPO
 		string
 		prompt "Release repository"
-		default "http://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/18.06.6"
+		default "http://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/18.06-SNAPSHOT"
 		help
 			This is the repository address embedded in the image, it defaults
 			to the trunk snapshot repo; the url may contain the following placeholders:
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ if VERSIONOPT
 	config VERSION_CODE_FILENAMES
 		bool
 		prompt "Revision code in filenames"
-		default n
+		default y
 		help
 			Enable this to include the revision identifier or the configured
 			version code into the firmware image, SDK- and Image Builder archive

package/boot/uboot-envtools/files/ar71xx

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ mr600v2|\
 mr900|\
 mr900v2|\
 n5q|\
+nbg6616|\
 nbg6716|\
 om5p|\
 om5p-ac|\

package/kernel/lantiq/ltq-ptm/Makefile

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=ltq-ptm
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
 PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(KERNEL_BUILD_DIR)/ltq-ptm-$(BUILD_VARIANT)
 
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>

package/kernel/lantiq/ltq-ptm/src/ifxmips_ptm_vdsl.c

@@ -334,6 +334,9 @@ static int ptm_hard_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
         dma_cache_wback((unsigned long)skb->data, skb->len);
     }
 
+    /* make the skb unowned */
+    skb_orphan(skb);
+
     *(struct sk_buff **)((unsigned int)skb->data - byteoff - sizeof(struct sk_buff *)) = skb;
     /*  write back to physical memory   */
     dma_cache_wback((unsigned long)skb->data - byteoff - sizeof(struct sk_buff *), skb->len + byteoff + sizeof(struct sk_buff *));

package/kernel/mac80211/Makefile

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel.mk
 PKG_NAME:=mac80211
 
 PKG_VERSION:=2017-11-01
-PKG_RELEASE:=10
+PKG_RELEASE:=11
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://mirror2.openwrt.org/sources
 PKG_HASH:=8437ab7886b988c8152e7a4db30b7f41009e49a3b2cb863edd05da1ecd7eb05a
 

package/kernel/mac80211/patches/478-brcmfmac-add-DMI_PRODUCT_SKU-conditionally.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/dmi.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/dmi.c
+@@ -53,7 +53,9 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id dmi_pl
+ 		.matches = {
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "To be filled by O.E.M."),
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "Cherry Trail CR"),
++#if LINUX_VERSION_IS_GEQ(4,18,0)
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_SKU, "T8"),
++#endif
+ 			/* also match on somewhat unique bios-version */
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "1.000"),
+ 		},
+@@ -64,7 +66,9 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id dmi_pl
+ 		.matches = {
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "To be filled by O.E.M."),
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "Cherry Trail CR"),
++#if LINUX_VERSION_IS_GEQ(4,18,0)
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_SKU, "T11"),
++#endif
+ 			/* also match on somewhat unique bios-version */
+ 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "1.000"),
+ 		},

package/kernel/mac80211/patches/480-mac80211-mark-station-unauthorized-before-key-remova.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 1ec47ff0525c4a530dc7783cb28044179334a4cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 15:51:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: mark station unauthorized before key removal
+
+commit b16798f5b907733966fd1a558fca823b3c67e4a1 upstream.
+
+If a station is still marked as authorized, mark it as no longer
+so before removing its keys. This allows frames transmitted to it
+to be rejected, providing additional protection against leaking
+plain text data during the disconnection flow.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ccb4fb0bb356.If48f0f0504efdcf16b8921f48c6d3bb2cb763c99@changeid
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+  * Copyright 2006-2007	Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
+  * Copyright 2013-2014  Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
+  * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
++ * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
+  *
+  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+@@ -976,6 +977,11 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(str
+ 	might_sleep();
+ 	lockdep_assert_held(&local->sta_mtx);
+ 
++	while (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED) {
++		ret = sta_info_move_state(sta, IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC);
++		WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
++	}
++
+ 	/* now keys can no longer be reached */
+ 	ieee80211_free_sta_keys(local, sta);
+ 

package/kernel/mac80211/patches/481-mac80211-Check-port-authorization-in-the-ieee80211_t.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 07dc42ff9b9c38eae221b36acda7134ab8670af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 15:51:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: Check port authorization in the
+ ieee80211_tx_dequeue() case
+
+commit ce2e1ca703071723ca2dd94d492a5ab6d15050da upstream.
+
+mac80211 used to check port authorization in the Data frame enqueue case
+when going through start_xmit(). However, that authorization status may
+change while the frame is waiting in a queue. Add a similar check in the
+dequeue case to avoid sending previously accepted frames after
+authorization change. This provides additional protection against
+potential leaking of frames after a station has been disconnected and
+the keys for it are being removed.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ced84317ea29.I34d4c47cd8cc8a4042b38a76f16a601fbcbfd9b3@changeid
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/mac80211/tx.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
+@@ -3496,8 +3496,25 @@ begin:
+ 	tx.sdata = vif_to_sdata(info->control.vif);
+ 	tx.hdrlen = ieee80211_padded_hdrlen(hw, hdr->frame_control);
+ 
+-	if (txq->sta)
++	if (txq->sta) {
+ 		tx.sta = container_of(txq->sta, struct sta_info, sta);
++		/*
++		 * Drop unicast frames to unauthorised stations unless they are
++		 * EAPOL frames from the local station.
++		 */
++		if (unlikely(!ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&tx.sdata->vif) &&
++			     tx.sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB &&
++			     !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
++			     !test_sta_flag(tx.sta, WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) &&
++			     (!(info->control.flags &
++				IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_PORT_CTRL_PROTO) ||
++			      !ether_addr_equal(tx.sdata->vif.addr,
++						hdr->addr2)))) {
++			I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_handlers_drop_unauth_port);
++			ieee80211_free_txskb(&local->hw, skb);
++			goto begin;
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The key can be removed while the packet was queued, so need to call

package/kernel/mac80211/patches/482-mac80211-fix-authentication-with-iwlwifi-mvm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 8ad73f9e86bdb079043868e3543d302b57068b80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 22:50:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: fix authentication with iwlwifi/mvm
+
+commit be8c827f50a0bcd56361b31ada11dc0a3c2fd240 upstream.
+
+The original patch didn't copy the ieee80211_is_data() condition
+because on most drivers the management frames don't go through
+this path. However, they do on iwlwifi/mvm, so we do need to keep
+the condition here.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: ce2e1ca70307 ("mac80211: Check port authorization in the ieee80211_tx_dequeue() case")
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Cc: Woody Suwalski <terraluna977@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/mac80211/tx.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
+@@ -3502,7 +3502,8 @@ begin:
+ 		 * Drop unicast frames to unauthorised stations unless they are
+ 		 * EAPOL frames from the local station.
+ 		 */
+-		if (unlikely(!ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&tx.sdata->vif) &&
++		if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
++			     !ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&tx.sdata->vif) &&
+ 			     tx.sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB &&
+ 			     !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
+ 			     !test_sta_flag(tx.sta, WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) &&

package/kernel/mac80211/patches/483-mac80211-fix-misplaced-while-instead-of-if.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 5981fe5b0529ba25d95f37d7faa434183ad618c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 11:02:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: fix misplaced while instead of if
+
+This never was intended to be a 'while' loop, it should've
+just been an 'if' instead of 'while'. Fix this.
+
+I noticed this while applying another patch from Ben that
+intended to fix a busy loop at this spot.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: b16798f5b907 ("mac80211: mark station unauthorized before key removal")
+Reported-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200803110209.253009ae41ff.I3522aad099392b31d5cf2dcca34cbac7e5832dde@changeid
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+---
+ net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(str
+ 	might_sleep();
+ 	lockdep_assert_held(&local->sta_mtx);
+ 
+-	while (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED) {
++	if (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED) {
+ 		ret = sta_info_move_state(sta, IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC);
+ 		WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
+ 	}

package/libs/libjson-c/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=json-c
 PKG_VERSION:=0.12.1
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_RELEASE:=2.1
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)-nodoc.tar.gz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://s3.amazonaws.com/json-c_releases/releases/

package/libs/libjson-c/patches/000-libm.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -43,12 +43,6 @@
+@@ -43,12 +43,6 @@ AC_FUNC_MEMCMP
  AC_FUNC_MALLOC
  AC_FUNC_REALLOC
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strcasecmp strdup strerror snprintf vsnprintf vasprintf open vsyslog strncasecmp setlocale)

package/libs/libjson-c/patches/001-Prevent-division-by-zero-in-linkhash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 77d935b7ae7871a1940cd827e850e6063044ec45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:46:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Prevent division by zero in linkhash.
+
+If a linkhash with a size of zero is created, then modulo operations
+are prone to division by zero operations.
+
+Purely protective measure against bad usage.
+---
+ linkhash.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/linkhash.c
++++ b/linkhash.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+  *
+  */
+ 
++#include <assert.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -431,6 +432,8 @@ struct lh_table* lh_table_new(int size,
+ 	int i;
+ 	struct lh_table *t;
+ 
++  /* Allocate space for elements to avoid divisions by zero. */
++  assert(size > 0);
+ 	t = (struct lh_table*)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table));
+ 	if(!t) lh_abort("lh_table_new: calloc failed\n");
+ 	t->count = 0;

package/libs/libjson-c/patches/002-Fix-integer-overflows.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From d07b91014986900a3a75f306d302e13e005e9d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:47:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflows.
+
+The data structures linkhash and printbuf are limited to 2 GB in size
+due to a signed integer being used to track their current size.
+
+If too much data is added, then size variable can overflow, which is
+an undefined behaviour in C programming language.
+
+Assuming that a signed int overflow just leads to a negative value,
+like it happens on many sytems (Linux i686/amd64 with gcc), then
+printbuf is vulnerable to an out of boundary write on 64 bit systems.
+---
+ linkhash.c |  7 +++++--
+ printbuf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/linkhash.c
++++ b/linkhash.c
+@@ -498,7 +498,12 @@ int lh_table_insert(struct lh_table *t,
+ 	unsigned long h, n;
+ 
+ 	t->inserts++;
+-	if(t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) lh_table_resize(t, t->size * 2);
++	if(t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) {
++		/* Avoid signed integer overflow with large tables. */
++		int new_size = (t->size > INT_MAX / 2) ? INT_MAX : (t->size * 2);
++		if (t->size != INT_MAX)
++			lh_table_resize(t, new_size);
++	}
+ 
+ 	h = t->hash_fn(k);
+ 	n = h % t->size;
+--- a/printbuf.c
++++ b/printbuf.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "config.h"
+ 
++#include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -63,7 +64,16 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printb
+ 	if (p->size >= min_size)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	new_size = json_max(p->size * 2, min_size + 8);
++	/* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
++	if (min_size > INT_MAX - 8)
++		return -1;
++	if (p->size > INT_MAX / 2)
++		new_size = min_size + 8;
++	else {
++		new_size = p->size * 2;
++		if (new_size < min_size + 8)
++			new_size = min_size + 8;
++	}
+ #ifdef PRINTBUF_DEBUG
+ 	MC_DEBUG("printbuf_memappend: realloc "
+ 	  "bpos=%d min_size=%d old_size=%d new_size=%d\n",
+@@ -78,6 +88,9 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printb
+ 
+ int printbuf_memappend(struct printbuf *p, const char *buf, int size)
+ {
++  /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
++  if (size > INT_MAX - p->bpos - 1)
++    return -1;
+   if (p->size <= p->bpos + size + 1) {
+     if (printbuf_extend(p, p->bpos + size + 1) < 0)
+       return -1;
+@@ -94,6 +107,9 @@ int printbuf_memset(struct printbuf *pb,
+ 
+ 	if (offset == -1)
+ 		offset = pb->bpos;
++	/* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
++	if (len > INT_MAX - offset)
++		return -1;
+ 	size_needed = offset + len;
+ 	if (pb->size < size_needed)
+ 	{

package/libs/libubox/Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=libubox
-PKG_RELEASE=2
+PKG_RELEASE=5
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/libubox.git

package/libs/libubox/patches/0001-blobmsg_json-fix-possible-uninitialized-struct-membe.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 2acfe84e4c871fb994c38c9f2508eb9ebd296b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 17:34:25 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg_json: fix possible uninitialized struct member
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+clang-10 analyzer reports following:
+
+ blobmsg_json.c:285:2: warning: The expression is an uninitialized value. The computed value will also be garbage
+         s->indent_level++;
+         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg_json.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg_json.c
++++ b/blobmsg_json.c
+@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void setup_strbuf(struct strbuf *
+ 
+ char *blobmsg_format_json_with_cb(struct blob_attr *attr, bool list, blobmsg_json_format_t cb, void *priv, int indent)
+ {
+-	struct strbuf s;
++	struct strbuf s = {0};
+ 	bool array;
+ 	char *ret;
+ 
+@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ char *blobmsg_format_json_with_cb(struct
+ 
+ char *blobmsg_format_json_value_with_cb(struct blob_attr *attr, blobmsg_json_format_t cb, void *priv, int indent)
+ {
+-	struct strbuf s;
++	struct strbuf s = {0};
+ 	char *ret;
+ 
+ 	setup_strbuf(&s, attr, cb, priv, indent);

package/libs/libubox/patches/0002-jshn-fix-off-by-one-in-jshn_parse_file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From f27853d71a2cb99ec5de3881716a14611ada307c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2019 22:48:25 +0100
+Subject: jshn: fix off by one in jshn_parse_file
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Fixes following error:
+
+ Invalid read of size 1
+   at 0x4C32D04: strlen
+   by 0x5043367: json_tokener_parse_ex
+   by 0x5045316: json_tokener_parse_verbose
+   by 0x504537D: json_tokener_parse
+   by 0x401AB1: jshn_parse (jshn.c:179)
+   by 0x40190D: jshn_parse_file (jshn.c:370)
+   by 0x40190D: main (jshn.c:434)
+ Address 0x5848c4c is 0 bytes after a block of size 1,036 alloc'd
+   at 0x4C2FB0F: malloc
+   by 0x4018E2: jshn_parse_file (jshn.c:357)
+   by 0x4018E2: main (jshn.c:434)
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ jshn.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/jshn.c
++++ b/jshn.c
+@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 				close(fd);
+ 				return 3;
+ 			}
+-			if (!(fbuf = malloc(sb.st_size))) {
++			if (!(fbuf = calloc(1, sb.st_size+1))) {
+ 				fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating memory for %s\n", optarg);
+ 				close(fd);
+ 				return 3;

package/libs/libubox/patches/0003-blob-refactor-attr-parsing-into-separate-function.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From af2a074160e32692b570f8a3562b4370d38f34e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 13:53:27 +0100
+Subject: blob: refactor attr parsing into separate function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Making blob_parse easier to review.
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blob.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blob.c
++++ b/blob.c
+@@ -217,44 +217,53 @@ blob_check_type(const void *ptr, unsigne
+ 	return true;
+ }
+ 
+-int
+-blob_parse(struct blob_attr *attr, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max)
++static int
++blob_parse_attr(struct blob_attr *attr, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max)
+ {
+-	struct blob_attr *pos;
+ 	int found = 0;
+-	int rem;
++	int id = blob_id(attr);
++	size_t len = blob_len(attr);
+ 
+-	memset(data, 0, sizeof(struct blob_attr *) * max);
+-	blob_for_each_attr(pos, attr, rem) {
+-		int id = blob_id(pos);
+-		int len = blob_len(pos);
++	if (id >= max)
++		return 0;
+ 
+-		if (id >= max)
+-			continue;
++	if (info) {
++		int type = info[id].type;
+ 
+-		if (info) {
+-			int type = info[id].type;
++		if (type < BLOB_ATTR_LAST) {
++			if (!blob_check_type(blob_data(attr), len, type))
++				return 0;
++		}
+ 
+-			if (type < BLOB_ATTR_LAST) {
+-				if (!blob_check_type(blob_data(pos), len, type))
+-					continue;
+-			}
++		if (info[id].minlen && len < info[id].minlen)
++			return 0;
+ 
+-			if (info[id].minlen && len < info[id].minlen)
+-				continue;
++		if (info[id].maxlen && len > info[id].maxlen)
++			return 0;
+ 
+-			if (info[id].maxlen && len > info[id].maxlen)
+-				continue;
++		if (info[id].validate && !info[id].validate(&info[id], attr))
++			return 0;
++	}
+ 
+-			if (info[id].validate && !info[id].validate(&info[id], pos))
+-				continue;
+-		}
++	if (!data[id])
++		found++;
+ 
+-		if (!data[id])
+-			found++;
++	data[id] = attr;
++	return found;
++}
+ 
+-		data[id] = pos;
++int
++blob_parse(struct blob_attr *attr, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max)
++{
++	struct blob_attr *pos;
++	int found = 0;
++	size_t rem;
++
++	memset(data, 0, sizeof(struct blob_attr *) * max);
++	blob_for_each_attr(pos, attr, rem) {
++		found += blob_parse_attr(pos, data, info, max);
+ 	}
++
+ 	return found;
+ }
+ 

package/libs/libubox/patches/0004-blob-introduce-blob_parse_untrusted.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From b6a0a070f2e14808e835c2fcfa3820a55041902f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 14:11:45 +0100
+Subject: blob: introduce blob_parse_untrusted
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+blob_parse can be only used on trusted input as it has no possibility to
+check the length of the provided input buffer, which might lead to
+undefined behaviour and/or crashes when supplied with malformed,
+corrupted or otherwise specially crafted input.
+
+So this introduces blob_parse_untrusted variant which expects additional
+input buffer length argument and thus should be able to process also
+inputs from untrusted sources.
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blob.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ blob.h |  7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/blob.c
++++ b/blob.c
+@@ -253,6 +253,30 @@ blob_parse_attr(struct blob_attr *attr,
+ }
+ 
+ int
++blob_parse_untrusted(struct blob_attr *attr, size_t attr_len, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max)
++{
++	struct blob_attr *pos;
++	size_t len = 0;
++	int found = 0;
++	size_t rem;
++
++	if (!attr || attr_len < sizeof(struct blob_attr))
++		return 0;
++
++	len = blob_raw_len(attr);
++	if (len != attr_len)
++		return 0;
++
++	memset(data, 0, sizeof(struct blob_attr *) * max);
++	blob_for_each_attr_len(pos, attr, len, rem) {
++		found += blob_parse_attr(pos, rem, data, info, max);
++	}
++
++	return found;
++}
++
++/* use only on trusted input, otherwise consider blob_parse_untrusted */
++int
+ blob_parse(struct blob_attr *attr, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max)
+ {
+ 	struct blob_attr *pos;
+--- a/blob.h
++++ b/blob.h
+@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ extern void blob_nest_end(struct blob_bu
+ extern struct blob_attr *blob_put(struct blob_buf *buf, int id, const void *ptr, unsigned int len);
+ extern bool blob_check_type(const void *ptr, unsigned int len, int type);
+ extern int blob_parse(struct blob_attr *attr, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max);
++extern int blob_parse_untrusted(struct blob_attr *attr, size_t attr_len, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max);
+ extern struct blob_attr *blob_memdup(struct blob_attr *attr);
+ extern struct blob_attr *blob_put_raw(struct blob_buf *buf, const void *ptr, unsigned int len);
+ 
+@@ -254,5 +255,11 @@ blob_put_u64(struct blob_buf *buf, int i
+ 	     (blob_pad_len(pos) >= sizeof(struct blob_attr)); \
+ 	     rem -= blob_pad_len(pos), pos = blob_next(pos))
+ 
++#define blob_for_each_attr_len(pos, attr, attr_len, rem) \
++	for (rem = attr ? blob_len(attr) : 0, \
++	     pos = (struct blob_attr *) (attr ? blob_data(attr) : NULL); \
++	     rem >= sizeof(struct blob_attr) && rem < attr_len && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
++	     (blob_pad_len(pos) >= sizeof(struct blob_attr)); \
++	     rem -= blob_pad_len(pos), pos = blob_next(pos))
+ 
+ #endif

package/libs/libubox/patches/0005-blob-fix-OOB-access-in-blob_check_type.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 7425d421340594f50c717ff7129b6ee71280a447 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 15:27:16 +0100
+Subject: blob: fix OOB access in blob_check_type
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Found by fuzzer:
+
+ ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x602100000455
+ The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
+     #0 in blob_check_type blob.c:214:43
+     #1 in blob_parse_attr blob.c:234:9
+     #2 in blob_parse_untrusted blob.c:272:12
+     #3 in fuzz_blob_parse tests/fuzzer/test-blob-parse-fuzzer.c:34:2
+     #4 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput tests/fuzzer/test-blob-parse-fuzzer.c:39:2
+
+Caused by following line:
+
+	if (type == BLOB_ATTR_STRING && data[len - 1] != 0)
+
+where len was pointing outside of the data buffer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blob.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blob.c
++++ b/blob.c
+@@ -218,20 +218,33 @@ blob_check_type(const void *ptr, unsigne
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-blob_parse_attr(struct blob_attr *attr, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max)
++blob_parse_attr(struct blob_attr *attr, size_t attr_len, struct blob_attr **data, const struct blob_attr_info *info, int max)
+ {
++	int id;
++	size_t len;
+ 	int found = 0;
+-	int id = blob_id(attr);
+-	size_t len = blob_len(attr);
++	size_t data_len;
+ 
++	if (!attr || attr_len < sizeof(struct blob_attr))
++		return 0;
++
++	id = blob_id(attr);
+ 	if (id >= max)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	len = blob_raw_len(attr);
++	if (len > attr_len || len < sizeof(struct blob_attr))
++		return 0;
++
++	data_len = blob_len(attr);
++	if (data_len > len)
++		return 0;
++
+ 	if (info) {
+ 		int type = info[id].type;
+ 
+ 		if (type < BLOB_ATTR_LAST) {
+-			if (!blob_check_type(blob_data(attr), len, type))
++			if (!blob_check_type(blob_data(attr), data_len, type))
+ 				return 0;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -285,7 +298,7 @@ blob_parse(struct blob_attr *attr, struc
+ 
+ 	memset(data, 0, sizeof(struct blob_attr *) * max);
+ 	blob_for_each_attr(pos, attr, rem) {
+-		found += blob_parse_attr(pos, data, info, max);
++		found += blob_parse_attr(pos, rem, data, info, max);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return found;

package/libs/libubox/patches/0006-blobmsg-fix-heap-buffer-overflow-in-blobmsg_parse.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 0773eef13674964d890420673d2501342979d8bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 12:02:40 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg: fix heap buffer overflow in blobmsg_parse
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Fixes following error found by the fuzzer:
+
+ ==29774==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
+ READ of size 1 at 0x6020004f1c56 thread T0
+     #0 strcmp sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:442:3
+     #1 blobmsg_parse blobmsg.c:168:8
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr(const struct blo
+ 
+ 	id = blob_id(attr);
+ 	len = blobmsg_data_len(attr);
++	if (len > blob_raw_len(attr))
++		return false;
++
+ 	data = blobmsg_data(attr);
+ 
+ 	if (id > BLOBMSG_TYPE_LAST)

package/libs/libubox/patches/0007-Ensure-blob_attr-length-check-does-not-perform-out-o.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From cec3ed2550073abbfe0f1f6131c44f90c9d05aa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Schramm <tobleminer@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 13:39:29 +0100
+Subject: Ensure blob_attr length check does not perform out of bounds reads
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Before there might have been as little as one single byte left which
+would result in 3 bytes of blob_attr->id_len being out of bounds.
+
+Acked-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Schramm <tobleminer@gmail.com>
+[line wrapped < 72 chars]
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blob.h    | 4 ++--
+ blobmsg.h | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blob.h
++++ b/blob.h
+@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ blob_put_u64(struct blob_buf *buf, int i
+ 
+ #define __blob_for_each_attr(pos, attr, rem) \
+ 	for (pos = (struct blob_attr *) attr; \
+-	     rem > 0 && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
++	     rem >= sizeof(struct blob_attr) && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
+ 	     (blob_pad_len(pos) >= sizeof(struct blob_attr)); \
+ 	     rem -= blob_pad_len(pos), pos = blob_next(pos))
+ 
+@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ blob_put_u64(struct blob_buf *buf, int i
+ #define blob_for_each_attr(pos, attr, rem) \
+ 	for (rem = attr ? blob_len(attr) : 0, \
+ 	     pos = (struct blob_attr *) (attr ? blob_data(attr) : NULL); \
+-	     rem > 0 && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
++	     rem >= sizeof(struct blob_attr) && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
+ 	     (blob_pad_len(pos) >= sizeof(struct blob_attr)); \
+ 	     rem -= blob_pad_len(pos), pos = blob_next(pos))
+ 
+--- a/blobmsg.h
++++ b/blobmsg.h
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int blobmsg_printf(struct blob_buf *buf,
+ #define blobmsg_for_each_attr(pos, attr, rem) \
+ 	for (rem = attr ? blobmsg_data_len(attr) : 0, \
+ 	     pos = (struct blob_attr *) (attr ? blobmsg_data(attr) : NULL); \
+-	     rem > 0 && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
++	     rem >= sizeof(struct blob_attr) && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
+ 	     (blob_pad_len(pos) >= sizeof(struct blob_attr)); \
+ 	     rem -= blob_pad_len(pos), pos = blob_next(pos))
+ 

package/libs/libubox/patches/0008-Replace-use-of-blobmsg_check_attr-by-blobmsg_check_a.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+From 8b6a401638317906b6d9039417c1c19ea8cfeab0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Schramm <tobleminer@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 04:16:12 +0100
+Subject: Replace use of blobmsg_check_attr by blobmsg_check_attr_len
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+blobmsg_check_attr_len adds a length limit specifying the max offset
+from attr that can be read safely.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Schramm <tobleminer@gmail.com>
+[rebased and reworked, line wrapped commit message, _safe -> _len]
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ blobmsg.h |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -33,37 +33,70 @@ blobmsg_namelen(const struct blobmsg_hdr
+ 
+ bool blobmsg_check_attr(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name)
+ {
++	return blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, name, blob_raw_len(attr));
++}
++
++static bool blobmsg_check_name(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len, bool name)
++{
++	char *limit = (char *) attr + len;
+ 	const struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr;
+-	const char *data;
+-	int id, len;
+ 
+-	if (blob_len(attr) < sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr))
++	hdr = blob_data(attr);
++	if (name && !hdr->namelen)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	hdr = (void *) attr->data;
+-	if (!hdr->namelen && name)
++	if ((char *) hdr->name + blobmsg_namelen(hdr) > limit)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	if (blobmsg_namelen(hdr) > blob_len(attr) - sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr))
++	if (blobmsg_namelen(hdr) > (blob_len(attr) - sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr)))
+ 		return false;
+ 
+ 	if (hdr->name[blobmsg_namelen(hdr)] != 0)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	id = blob_id(attr);
+-	len = blobmsg_data_len(attr);
+-	if (len > blob_raw_len(attr))
+-		return false;
++	return true;
++}
++
++static const char* blobmsg_check_data(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len, size_t *data_len)
++{
++	char *limit = (char *) attr + len;
++	const char *data;
++
++	*data_len = blobmsg_data_len(attr);
++	if (*data_len > blob_raw_len(attr))
++		return NULL;
+ 
+ 	data = blobmsg_data(attr);
++	if (data + *data_len > limit)
++		return NULL;
+ 
++	return data;
++}
++
++bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name, size_t len)
++{
++	const char *data;
++	size_t data_len;
++	int id;
++
++	if (len < sizeof(struct blob_attr))
++		return false;
++
++	if (!blobmsg_check_name(attr, len, name))
++		return false;
++
++	id = blob_id(attr);
+ 	if (id > BLOBMSG_TYPE_LAST)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+ 	if (!blob_type[id])
+ 		return true;
+ 
+-	return blob_check_type(data, len, blob_type[id]);
++	data = blobmsg_check_data(attr, len, &data_len);
++	if (!data)
++		return false;
++
++	return blob_check_type(data, data_len, blob_type[id]);
+ }
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type)
+@@ -114,7 +147,7 @@ int blobmsg_parse_array(const struct blo
+ 		    blob_id(attr) != policy[i].type)
+ 			continue;
+ 
+-		if (!blobmsg_check_attr(attr, false))
++		if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, false, len))
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		if (tb[i])
+@@ -161,7 +194,7 @@ int blobmsg_parse(const struct blobmsg_p
+ 			if (blobmsg_namelen(hdr) != pslen[i])
+ 				continue;
+ 
+-			if (!blobmsg_check_attr(attr, true))
++			if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, true, len))
+ 				return -1;
+ 
+ 			if (tb[i])
+--- a/blobmsg.h
++++ b/blobmsg.h
+@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static inline int blobmsg_len(const stru
+ bool blobmsg_check_attr(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name);
+ bool blobmsg_check_attr_list(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type);
+ 
++bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name, size_t len);
++
+ /*
+  * blobmsg_check_array: validate array/table and return size
+  *

package/libs/libubox/patches/0009-blobmsg-add-_len-variants-for-all-attribute-checking.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From ad29d0304983e283d4aec4ee5462942eaf5c03ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Schramm <tobleminer@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 03:42:48 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg: add _len variants for all attribute checking methods
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Introduce _len variants of blobmsg attribute checking functions which
+aims to provide safer implementation as those functions should limit all
+memory accesses performed on the blob to the range [attr, attr + len]
+(upper bound non inclusive) and thus should be suited for checking of
+untrusted blob attributes.
+
+While at it add some comments in order to make it clear.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Schramm <tobleminer@gmail.com>
+[_safe -> _len, blobmsg_check_array_len fix, commit subject/desc facelift]
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
+ blobmsg.h | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -101,11 +101,21 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type)
+ {
++	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blob_raw_len(attr));
++}
++
++int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type, size_t len)
++{
+ 	struct blob_attr *cur;
+ 	bool name;
+-	int rem;
+ 	int size = 0;
+ 
++	if (type > BLOBMSG_TYPE_LAST)
++		return -1;
++
++	if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, false, len))
++		return -1;
++
+ 	switch (blobmsg_type(attr)) {
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_TABLE:
+ 		name = true;
+@@ -117,11 +127,11 @@ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blo
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	blobmsg_for_each_attr(cur, attr, rem) {
++	__blobmsg_for_each_attr(cur, attr, len) {
+ 		if (type != BLOBMSG_TYPE_UNSPEC && blobmsg_type(cur) != type)
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+-		if (!blobmsg_check_attr(cur, name))
++		if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(cur, name, len))
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		size++;
+@@ -135,6 +145,11 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr_list(const struc
+ 	return blobmsg_check_array(attr, type) >= 0;
+ }
+ 
++bool blobmsg_check_attr_list_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type, size_t len)
++{
++	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, len) >= 0;
++}
++
+ int blobmsg_parse_array(const struct blobmsg_policy *policy, int policy_len,
+ 			struct blob_attr **tb, void *data, unsigned int len)
+ {
+--- a/blobmsg.h
++++ b/blobmsg.h
+@@ -104,19 +104,66 @@ static inline int blobmsg_len(const stru
+ 	return blobmsg_data_len(attr);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * blobmsg_check_attr: validate a list of attributes
++ *
++ * This method may be used with trusted data only. Providing
++ * malformed blobs will cause out of bounds memory access.
++ */
+ bool blobmsg_check_attr(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name);
+-bool blobmsg_check_attr_list(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type);
+ 
++/*
++ * blobmsg_check_attr_len: validate a list of attributes
++ *
++ * This method should be safer implementation of blobmsg_check_attr.
++ * It will limit all memory access performed on the blob to the
++ * range [attr, attr + len] (upper bound non inclusive) and is
++ * thus suited for checking of untrusted blob attributes.
++ */
+ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name, size_t len);
+ 
+ /*
++ * blobmsg_check_attr_list: validate a list of attributes
++ *
++ * This method may be used with trusted data only. Providing
++ * malformed blobs will cause out of bounds memory access.
++ */
++bool blobmsg_check_attr_list(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type);
++
++/*
++ * blobmsg_check_attr_list_len: validate a list of untrusted attributes
++ *
++ * This method should be safer implementation of blobmsg_check_attr_list.
++ * It will limit all memory access performed on the blob to the
++ * range [attr, attr + len] (upper bound non inclusive) and is
++ * thus suited for checking of untrusted blob attributes.
++ */
++bool blobmsg_check_attr_list_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type, size_t len);
++
++/*
+  * blobmsg_check_array: validate array/table and return size
+  *
+  * Checks if all elements of an array or table are valid and have
+  * the specified type. Returns the number of elements in the array
++ *
++ * This method may be used with trusted data only. Providing
++ * malformed blobs will cause out of bounds memory access.
+  */
+ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type);
+ 
++/*
++ * blobmsg_check_array_len: validate untrusted array/table and return size
++ *
++ * Checks if all elements of an array or table are valid and have
++ * the specified type. Returns the number of elements in the array.
++ *
++ * This method should be safer implementation of blobmsg_check_array.
++ * It will limit all memory access performed on the blob to the
++ * range [attr, attr + len] (upper bound non inclusive) and is
++ * thus suited for checking of untrusted blob attributes.
++ */
++int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type, size_t len);
++
+ int blobmsg_parse(const struct blobmsg_policy *policy, int policy_len,
+                   struct blob_attr **tb, void *data, unsigned int len);
+ int blobmsg_parse_array(const struct blobmsg_policy *policy, int policy_len,
+@@ -271,5 +318,11 @@ int blobmsg_printf(struct blob_buf *buf,
+ 	     rem >= sizeof(struct blob_attr) && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
+ 	     (blob_pad_len(pos) >= sizeof(struct blob_attr)); \
+ 	     rem -= blob_pad_len(pos), pos = blob_next(pos))
++
++#define __blobmsg_for_each_attr(pos, attr, rem) \
++	for (pos = (struct blob_attr *) (attr ? blobmsg_data(attr) : NULL); \
++	     rem >= sizeof(struct blob_attr) && (blob_pad_len(pos) <= rem) && \
++	     (blob_pad_len(pos) >= sizeof(struct blob_attr)); \
++	     rem -= blob_pad_len(pos), pos = blob_next(pos))
+ 
+ #endif

package/libs/libubox/patches/0010-blobmsg-fix-array-out-of-bounds-GCC-10-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 44d9e85ef058fbb9981d53218cafdc451afa5535 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Wed, 25 Dec 2019 10:27:59 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg: fix array out of bounds GCC 10 warning
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Fixes following warning reported by GCC 10.0.0 20191203:
+
+ blobmsg.c:234:2: error: 'strcpy' offset 6 from the object at 'attr' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'name' with type 'uint8_t[0]' {aka 'unsigned char[0]'} at offset 6 [-Werror=array-bounds]
+   234 |  strcpy((char *) hdr->name, (const char *)name);
+       |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ In file included from blobmsg.c:16:
+ blobmsg.h:42:10: note: subobject 'name' declared here
+    42 |  uint8_t name[];
+       |          ^~~~
+
+Reported-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -246,7 +246,10 @@ blobmsg_new(struct blob_buf *buf, int ty
+ 	attr->id_len |= be32_to_cpu(BLOB_ATTR_EXTENDED);
+ 	hdr = blob_data(attr);
+ 	hdr->namelen = cpu_to_be16(namelen);
+-	strcpy((char *) hdr->name, (const char *)name);
++
++	memcpy(hdr->name, name, namelen);
++	hdr->name[namelen] = '\0';
++
+ 	pad_end = *data = blobmsg_data(attr);
+ 	pad_start = (char *) &hdr->name[namelen];
+ 	if (pad_start < pad_end)

package/libs/libubox/patches/0011-blobmsg-fix-wrong-payload-len-passed-from-blobmsg_ch.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From d0f05d5e6873b30315127d47abbf4ac9f3c8bfb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2019 19:00:39 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg: fix wrong payload len passed from blobmsg_check_array
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Fix incorrect use of blob_raw_len() on passed blobmsg to
+blobmsg_check_array_len()  introduced in commit b0e21553ae8c ("blobmsg:
+add _len variants for all attribute checking methods") by using correct
+blobmsg_len().
+
+This wrong (higher) length was then for example causing issues in
+procd's instance_config_parse_command() where blobmsg_check_attr_list()
+was failing sanity checking of service command, thus resulting in the
+startup failures of some services like collectd, nlbwmon and samba4.
+
+Ref: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/openwrt-devel/2019-December/020840.html
+Fixes: b0e21553ae8c ("blobmsg: add _len variants for all attribute checking methods")
+Reported-by: Hannu Nyman <hannu.nyman@welho.com>
+Tested-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type)
+ {
+-	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blob_raw_len(attr));
++	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blobmsg_len(attr));
+ }
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type, size_t len)

package/libs/libubox/patches/0012-jshn-prefer-snprintf-usage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 31778937b4153492955495e550435c8bbf7cfde8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 08:55:34 +0100
+Subject: jshn: prefer snprintf usage
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Better safe than sorry.
+
+Reviewed-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ jshn.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/jshn.c
++++ b/jshn.c
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int add_json_array(struct array_l
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0, len = array_list_length(a); i < len; i++) {
+-		sprintf(seq, "%d", i);
++		snprintf(seq, sizeof(seq), "%d", i);
+ 		ret = add_json_element(seq, array_list_get_idx(a, i));
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret;
+@@ -197,25 +197,27 @@ static char *getenv_avl(const char *key)
+ static char *get_keys(const char *prefix)
+ {
+ 	char *keys;
++	size_t len = var_prefix_len + strlen(prefix) + sizeof("K_") + 1;
+ 
+-	keys = alloca(var_prefix_len + strlen(prefix) + sizeof("K_") + 1);
+-	sprintf(keys, "%sK_%s", var_prefix, prefix);
++	keys = alloca(len);
++	snprintf(keys, len, "%sK_%s", var_prefix, prefix);
+ 	return getenv_avl(keys);
+ }
+ 
+ static void get_var(const char *prefix, const char **name, char **var, char **type)
+ {
+ 	char *tmpname, *varname;
++	size_t len = var_prefix_len + strlen(prefix) + 1 + strlen(*name) + 1 + sizeof("T_");
+ 
+-	tmpname = alloca(var_prefix_len + strlen(prefix) + 1 + strlen(*name) + 1 + sizeof("T_"));
++	tmpname = alloca(len);
+ 
+-	sprintf(tmpname, "%s%s_%s", var_prefix, prefix, *name);
++	snprintf(tmpname, len, "%s%s_%s", var_prefix, prefix, *name);
+ 	*var = getenv_avl(tmpname);
+ 
+-	sprintf(tmpname, "%sT_%s_%s", var_prefix, prefix, *name);
++	snprintf(tmpname, len, "%sT_%s_%s", var_prefix, prefix, *name);
+ 	*type = getenv_avl(tmpname);
+ 
+-	sprintf(tmpname, "%sN_%s_%s", var_prefix, prefix, *name);
++	snprintf(tmpname, len, "%sN_%s_%s", var_prefix, prefix, *name);
+ 	varname = getenv_avl(tmpname);
+ 	if (varname)
+ 		*name = varname;

package/libs/libubox/patches/0013-blobmsg-blobmsg_vprintf-prefer-vsnprintf.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 935bb933e4a74de7326a4373340fd50655712334 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 08:57:05 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg: blobmsg_vprintf: prefer vsnprintf
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Better safe than sorry and while at it add handling of possible
+*printf() failures.
+
+Reviewed-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -296,10 +296,17 @@ blobmsg_vprintf(struct blob_buf *buf, co
+ 	len = vsnprintf(&cbuf, sizeof(cbuf), format, arg2);
+ 	va_end(arg2);
+ 
++	if (len < 0)
++		return -1;
++
+ 	sbuf = blobmsg_alloc_string_buffer(buf, name, len + 1);
+ 	if (!sbuf)
+ 		return -1;
+-	ret = vsprintf(sbuf, format, arg);
++
++	ret = vsnprintf(sbuf, len + 1, format, arg);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		return -1;
++
+ 	blobmsg_add_string_buffer(buf);
+ 
+ 	return ret;

package/libs/libubox/patches/0014-blobmsg_json-fix-int16-serialization.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 1cc755d7c3989b399bf0c60535a858d22819ca27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2020 22:40:18 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg_json: fix int16 serialization
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+int16 blobmsg type is currently being serialized as uint16_t due to
+missing cast during JSON output.
+
+Following blobmsg content:
+
+ bar-min: -32768 (i16)
+ bar-max: 32767 (i16)
+
+Produces following JSON:
+
+ { "bar-min":32768,"bar-max":32767 }
+
+Whereas one would expect:
+
+ { "bar-min":-32768,"bar-max":32767 }
+
+Reviewed-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg_json.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg_json.c
++++ b/blobmsg_json.c
+@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static void blobmsg_format_element(struc
+ 		sprintf(buf, "%s", *(uint8_t *)data ? "true" : "false");
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_INT16:
+-		sprintf(buf, "%d", be16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)data));
++		sprintf(buf, "%d", (int16_t) be16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)data));
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_INT32:
+ 		sprintf(buf, "%d", (int32_t) be32_to_cpu(*(uint32_t *)data));

package/libs/libubox/patches/0015-blobmsg_json-prefer-snprintf-usage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 0e330ec3662795aea42ac36ecf7a9f32a249c36d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 09:05:02 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg_json: prefer snprintf usage
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Better safe than sorry and while at it prefer use of PRId16 and PRId32
+formatting constants as well.
+
+Reviewed-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg_json.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg_json.c
++++ b/blobmsg_json.c
+@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static void blobmsg_format_string(struct
+ 		buf[1] = escape;
+ 
+ 		if (escape == 'u') {
+-			sprintf(buf + 4, "%02x", (unsigned char) *p);
++			snprintf(buf + 4, sizeof(buf) - 4, "%02x", (unsigned char) *p);
+ 			len = 6;
+ 		} else {
+ 			len = 2;
+@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static void blobmsg_format_json_list(str
+ static void blobmsg_format_element(struct strbuf *s, struct blob_attr *attr, bool without_name, bool head)
+ {
+ 	const char *data_str;
+-	char buf[32];
++	char buf[317];
+ 	void *data;
+ 	int len;
+ 
+@@ -244,22 +244,22 @@ static void blobmsg_format_element(struc
+ 	data_str = buf;
+ 	switch(blob_id(attr)) {
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_UNSPEC:
+-		sprintf(buf, "null");
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "null");
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_BOOL:
+-		sprintf(buf, "%s", *(uint8_t *)data ? "true" : "false");
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s", *(uint8_t *)data ? "true" : "false");
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_INT16:
+-		sprintf(buf, "%d", (int16_t) be16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)data));
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" PRId16, (int16_t) be16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)data));
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_INT32:
+-		sprintf(buf, "%d", (int32_t) be32_to_cpu(*(uint32_t *)data));
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" PRId32, (int32_t) be32_to_cpu(*(uint32_t *)data));
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_INT64:
+-		sprintf(buf, "%" PRId64, (int64_t) be64_to_cpu(*(uint64_t *)data));
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" PRId64, (int64_t) be64_to_cpu(*(uint64_t *)data));
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_DOUBLE:
+-		sprintf(buf, "%lf", blobmsg_get_double(attr));
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lf", blobmsg_get_double(attr));
+ 		break;
+ 	case BLOBMSG_TYPE_STRING:
+ 		blobmsg_format_string(s, data);

package/libs/libubox/patches/0016-blobmsg-blobmsg_parse-and-blobmsg_parse_array-oob-re.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+From 6289e2d29883d5d9510b6a15c18c597478967a42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juraj Vijtiuk <juraj.vijtiuk@sartura.hr>
+Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2020 12:26:18 +0100
+Subject: blobmsg: blobmsg_parse and blobmsg_parse_array oob read fixes
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Fix out of bounds read in blobmsg_parse and blobmsg_check_name. The
+out of bounds read happens because blob_attr and blobmsg_hdr have
+flexible array members, whose size is 0 in the corresponding sizeofs.
+For example the __blob_for_each_attr macro checks whether rem >=
+sizeof(struct blob_attr). However, what LibFuzzer discovered was,
+if the input data was only 4 bytes, the data would be casted to blob_attr,
+and later on blob_data(attr) would be called even though attr->data was empty.
+The same issue could appear with data larger than 4 bytes, where data
+wasn't empty, but contained only the start of the blobmsg_hdr struct,
+and blobmsg_hdr name was empty. The bugs were discovered by fuzzing
+blobmsg_parse and blobmsg_array_parse with LibFuzzer.
+
+CC: Luka Perkov <luka.perkov@sartura.hr>
+Reviewed-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Signed-off-by: Juraj Vijtiuk <juraj.vijtiuk@sartura.hr>
+[refactored some checks, added fuzz inputs, adjusted unit test results]
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -36,16 +36,38 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr(const struct blo
+ 	return blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, name, blob_raw_len(attr));
+ }
+ 
++static const struct blobmsg_hdr* blobmsg_hdr_from_blob(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len)
++{
++	if (len < sizeof(struct blob_attr) + sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr))
++		return NULL;
++
++	return blob_data(attr);
++}
++
++static bool blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen(const struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr, size_t len)
++{
++	if (len < sizeof(struct blob_attr) + sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr) + blobmsg_namelen(hdr) + 1)
++		return false;
++
++	return true;
++}
++
+ static bool blobmsg_check_name(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len, bool name)
+ {
+ 	char *limit = (char *) attr + len;
+ 	const struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr;
+ 
+-	hdr = blob_data(attr);
++	hdr = blobmsg_hdr_from_blob(attr, len);
++	if (!hdr)
++		return false;
++
+ 	if (name && !hdr->namelen)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	if ((char *) hdr->name + blobmsg_namelen(hdr) > limit)
++	if (name && !blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen(hdr, len))
++		return false;
++
++	if ((char *) hdr->name + blobmsg_namelen(hdr) + 1 > limit)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+ 	if (blobmsg_namelen(hdr) > (blob_len(attr) - sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr)))
+@@ -79,9 +101,6 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct
+ 	size_t data_len;
+ 	int id;
+ 
+-	if (len < sizeof(struct blob_attr))
+-		return false;
+-
+ 	if (!blobmsg_check_name(attr, len, name))
+ 		return false;
+ 
+@@ -176,11 +195,10 @@ int blobmsg_parse_array(const struct blo
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-
+ int blobmsg_parse(const struct blobmsg_policy *policy, int policy_len,
+                   struct blob_attr **tb, void *data, unsigned int len)
+ {
+-	struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr;
++	const struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr;
+ 	struct blob_attr *attr;
+ 	uint8_t *pslen;
+ 	int i;
+@@ -197,7 +215,13 @@ int blobmsg_parse(const struct blobmsg_p
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	__blob_for_each_attr(attr, data, len) {
+-		hdr = blob_data(attr);
++		hdr = blobmsg_hdr_from_blob(attr, len);
++		if (!hdr)
++			return -1;
++
++		if (!blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen(hdr, len))
++			return -1;
++
+ 		for (i = 0; i < policy_len; i++) {
+ 			if (!policy[i].name)
+ 				continue;

package/libs/libubox/patches/0017-blobmsg-fix-wrong-payload-len-passed-from-blobmsg_ch.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 75e300aeec25e032a9778bea34c713969960d1f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Nisbet <nischris@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2020 21:00:31 +1300
+Subject: [PATCH] blobmsg: fix wrong payload len passed from
+ blobmsg_check_array
+
+Fix incorrect use of blobmsg_len() on passed blobmsg to
+blobmsg_check_array_len() introduced in commit 379cd33d1992
+("fix wrong payload len passed from blobmsg_check_array") by using correct
+blob_len().
+
+By using blobmsg_len() a value too small was passed to blobmsg_check_array()
+which could lead to this function returning an error when there is none.
+
+Fixes: 379cd33d1992 ("fix wrong payload len passed from blobmsg_check_array")
+Signed-off-by: Chris Nisbet <nischris@gmail.com>
+[add fixes tag, rewrap commit message]
+Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type)
+ {
+-	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blobmsg_len(attr));
++	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blob_len(attr));
+ }
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type, size_t len)

package/libs/libubox/patches/0018-blobmsg-fix-attrs-iteration-in-the-blobmsg_check_arr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 5e75160f48785464f9213c6bc8c72b9372c5318b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Rafa=C5=82=20Mi=C5=82ecki?= <rafal@milecki.pl>
+Date: Sat, 23 May 2020 13:18:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] blobmsg: fix attrs iteration in the blobmsg_check_array_len()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Starting with 75e300aeec25 ("blobmsg: fix wrong payload len passed from
+blobmsg_check_array") blobmsg_check_array_len() gets *blob* length
+passed as argument. It cannot be used with __blobmsg_for_each_attr()
+which expects *data* length.
+
+Use blobmsg_for_each_attr() which calculates *data* length on its own.
+
+The same bug was already reported in the past and there was fix attempt
+in the commit cd75136b1342 ("blobmsg: fix wrong payload len passed from
+blobmsg_check_array"). That change made blobmsg_check_attr_len() calls
+fail however.
+
+This is hopefully the correct & complete fix:
+1. blobmsg_check_array_len() gets *blob* length
+2. It calls blobmsg_check_attr_len() which requires *blob* length
+3. It uses blobmsg_for_each_attr() which gets *data* length
+
+This fixes iterating over random memory treated as attrs. That was
+resulting in check failing randomly for totally correct blobs. It's
+critical e.g. for procd project with its instance_fill_array() failing
+and procd not starting services.
+
+Fixes: 75e300aeec25 ("blobmsg: fix wrong payload len passed from blobmsg_check_array")
+Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -123,16 +123,18 @@ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blo
+ 	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blob_len(attr));
+ }
+ 
+-int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type, size_t len)
++int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type,
++			    size_t blob_len)
+ {
+ 	struct blob_attr *cur;
++	size_t rem;
+ 	bool name;
+ 	int size = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (type > BLOBMSG_TYPE_LAST)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, false, len))
++	if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, false, blob_len))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	switch (blobmsg_type(attr)) {
+@@ -146,11 +148,11 @@ int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	__blobmsg_for_each_attr(cur, attr, len) {
++	blobmsg_for_each_attr(cur, attr, rem) {
+ 		if (type != BLOBMSG_TYPE_UNSPEC && blobmsg_type(cur) != type)
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+-		if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(cur, name, len))
++		if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(cur, name, rem))
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		size++;

package/libs/libubox/patches/0019-blobmsg-fix-length-in-blobmsg_check_array.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From c2fc622b771f679e8f55060ac60cfe02b9a80995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
+Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 13:44:20 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] blobmsg: fix length in blobmsg_check_array
+
+blobmsg_check_array_len expects the length of the full attribute buffer,
+not just the data length.
+Due to other missing length checks (fixed in the next commit), this did
+not show up as a test failure
+
+Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type)
+ {
+-	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blob_len(attr));
++	return blobmsg_check_array_len(attr, type, blob_raw_len(attr));
+ }
+ 
+ int blobmsg_check_array_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, int type,

package/libs/libubox/patches/0020-blobmsg-simplify-and-fix-name-length-checks-in-blobm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 639c29d19717616b809d9a1e9042461ab8024370 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
+Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 14:49:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] blobmsg: simplify and fix name length checks in
+ blobmsg_check_name
+
+blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen was omitted when name==false
+The blob_len vs blobmsg_namelen changes were not taking into account
+potential padding between name and data
+
+Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 13 ++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ static bool blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen(co
+ 
+ static bool blobmsg_check_name(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len, bool name)
+ {
+-	char *limit = (char *) attr + len;
+ 	const struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr;
++	uint16_t namelen;
+ 
+ 	hdr = blobmsg_hdr_from_blob(attr, len);
+ 	if (!hdr)
+@@ -64,16 +64,11 @@ static bool blobmsg_check_name(const str
+ 	if (name && !hdr->namelen)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	if (name && !blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen(hdr, len))
++	namelen = blobmsg_namelen(hdr);
++	if (blob_len(attr) < (size_t)blobmsg_hdrlen(namelen))
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	if ((char *) hdr->name + blobmsg_namelen(hdr) + 1 > limit)
+-		return false;
+-
+-	if (blobmsg_namelen(hdr) > (blob_len(attr) - sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr)))
+-		return false;
+-
+-	if (hdr->name[blobmsg_namelen(hdr)] != 0)
++	if (hdr->name[namelen] != 0)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+ 	return true;

package/libs/libubox/patches/0021-blobmsg-fix-missing-length-checks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+From 66195aee50424cbda0c2d858014e4cc58a2dc029 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
+Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 12:40:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] blobmsg: fix missing length checks
+
+blobmsg_check_attr_len was calling blobmsg_check_data for some, but not all
+attribute types. These checks was missing for arrays and tables.
+
+Additionally, the length check in blobmsg_check_data was a bit off, since
+it was comparing the blobmsg data length against the raw blob attr length.
+
+Fix this by checking the raw blob length against the buffer length in
+blobmsg_hdr_from_blob
+
+Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
+---
+ blobmsg.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++--------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/blobmsg.c
++++ b/blobmsg.c
+@@ -36,31 +36,18 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr(const struct blo
+ 	return blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, name, blob_raw_len(attr));
+ }
+ 
+-static const struct blobmsg_hdr* blobmsg_hdr_from_blob(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len)
+-{
+-	if (len < sizeof(struct blob_attr) + sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr))
+-		return NULL;
+-
+-	return blob_data(attr);
+-}
+-
+-static bool blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen(const struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr, size_t len)
+-{
+-	if (len < sizeof(struct blob_attr) + sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr) + blobmsg_namelen(hdr) + 1)
+-		return false;
+-
+-	return true;
+-}
+-
+-static bool blobmsg_check_name(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len, bool name)
++static bool blobmsg_check_name(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name)
+ {
+ 	const struct blobmsg_hdr *hdr;
+ 	uint16_t namelen;
+ 
+-	hdr = blobmsg_hdr_from_blob(attr, len);
+-	if (!hdr)
++	if (!blob_is_extended(attr))
++		return !name;
++
++	if (blob_len(attr) < sizeof(struct blobmsg_hdr))
+ 		return false;
+ 
++	hdr = (const struct blobmsg_hdr *)blob_data(attr);
+ 	if (name && !hdr->namelen)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+@@ -74,29 +61,20 @@ static bool blobmsg_check_name(const str
+ 	return true;
+ }
+ 
+-static const char* blobmsg_check_data(const struct blob_attr *attr, size_t len, size_t *data_len)
+-{
+-	char *limit = (char *) attr + len;
+-	const char *data;
+-
+-	*data_len = blobmsg_data_len(attr);
+-	if (*data_len > blob_raw_len(attr))
+-		return NULL;
+-
+-	data = blobmsg_data(attr);
+-	if (data + *data_len > limit)
+-		return NULL;
+-
+-	return data;
+-}
+-
+ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct blob_attr *attr, bool name, size_t len)
+ {
+ 	const char *data;
+ 	size_t data_len;
+ 	int id;
+ 
+-	if (!blobmsg_check_name(attr, len, name))
++	if (len < sizeof(struct blob_attr))
++		return false;
++
++	data_len = blob_raw_len(attr);
++	if (data_len < sizeof(struct blob_attr) || data_len > len)
++		return false;
++
++	if (!blobmsg_check_name(attr, name))
+ 		return false;
+ 
+ 	id = blob_id(attr);
+@@ -106,9 +84,8 @@ bool blobmsg_check_attr_len(const struct
+ 	if (!blob_type[id])
+ 		return true;
+ 
+-	data = blobmsg_check_data(attr, len, &data_len);
+-	if (!data)
+-		return false;
++	data = blobmsg_data(attr);
++	data_len = blobmsg_data_len(attr);
+ 
+ 	return blob_check_type(data, data_len, blob_type[id]);
+ }
+@@ -212,13 +189,13 @@ int blobmsg_parse(const struct blobmsg_p
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	__blob_for_each_attr(attr, data, len) {
+-		hdr = blobmsg_hdr_from_blob(attr, len);
+-		if (!hdr)
++		if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, false, len))
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+-		if (!blobmsg_hdr_valid_namelen(hdr, len))
+-			return -1;
++		if (!blob_is_extended(attr))
++			continue;
+ 
++		hdr = blob_data(attr);
+ 		for (i = 0; i < policy_len; i++) {
+ 			if (!policy[i].name)
+ 				continue;
+@@ -230,9 +207,6 @@ int blobmsg_parse(const struct blobmsg_p
+ 			if (blobmsg_namelen(hdr) != pslen[i])
+ 				continue;
+ 
+-			if (!blobmsg_check_attr_len(attr, true, len))
+-				return -1;
+-
+ 			if (tb[i])
+ 				continue;
+ 

package/libs/mbedtls/Makefile

@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=mbedtls
-PKG_VERSION:=2.16.3
+PKG_VERSION:=2.16.8
 PKG_RELEASE:=1
 PKG_USE_MIPS16:=0
 
-PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)-gpl.tgz
-PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://tls.mbed.org/download/
-PKG_HASH:=fd01fe4b289116df7781d05e1ef712b6c98823c5334f4a27404f13a8d066ef6a
+PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://codeload.github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tar.gz/v$(PKG_VERSION)?
+PKG_HASH:=fe9e3b15c3375943bdfebbbb20dd6b4f1147b3b5d926248bd835d73247407430
 
 PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
 PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0+

package/libs/mbedtls/patches/200-config.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
 +++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
-@@ -633,14 +633,14 @@
+@@ -692,14 +692,14 @@
   *
   * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers.
   */
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER
-@@ -750,19 +750,19 @@
+@@ -816,19 +816,19 @@
   *
   * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it
   */
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
-@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@
+@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@
   *
   * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA.
   */
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
-@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@
+@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@
   *             See dhm.h for more details.
   *
   */
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
-@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@
+@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
   */
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
-@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@
+@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
   */
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
-@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@
+@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
   */
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
-@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@
+@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
   */
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
-@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@
+@@ -1259,7 +1259,7 @@
   * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and
   * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used.
   */
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
-@@ -1266,14 +1266,14 @@
+@@ -1354,14 +1354,14 @@
   * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA.
   *
   */
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
-@@ -1289,7 +1289,7 @@
+@@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@
   *
   * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256.
   */
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
-@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@
+@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@
   *          configuration of this extension).
   *
   */
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO
-@@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@
+@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@
   *
   * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets
   */
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
-@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@
+@@ -1720,7 +1720,7 @@
   *
   * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL
   */
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT
-@@ -1691,7 +1691,7 @@
+@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@
   *
   * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space
   */
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3
-@@ -2021,7 +2021,7 @@
+@@ -2109,7 +2109,7 @@
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
   *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
   */
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
-@@ -2087,7 +2087,7 @@
+@@ -2175,7 +2175,7 @@
   * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are
   * enabled as well.
   */
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C
-@@ -2099,7 +2099,7 @@
+@@ -2187,7 +2187,7 @@
   *
   * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server).
   */
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
-@@ -2108,7 +2108,7 @@
+@@ -2196,7 +2196,7 @@
   *
   * Module:  library/chacha20.c
   */
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
-@@ -2119,7 +2119,7 @@
+@@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@
   *
   * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
   */
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
-@@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@
+@@ -2266,7 +2266,7 @@
   *
   * This module provides debugging functions.
   */
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C
-@@ -2203,7 +2203,7 @@
+@@ -2295,7 +2295,7 @@
   * \warning   DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
   *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
   */
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C
-@@ -2366,7 +2366,7 @@
+@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@
   * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code
   * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF).
   */
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
-@@ -2380,7 +2380,7 @@
+@@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@
   *
   * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number geerator.
   */
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
-@@ -2676,7 +2676,7 @@
+@@ -2768,7 +2768,7 @@
   *
   * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions.
   */
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
-@@ -2686,7 +2686,7 @@
+@@ -2778,7 +2778,7 @@
   * Module:  library/poly1305.c
   * Caller:  library/chachapoly.c
   */
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
-@@ -2697,7 +2697,7 @@
+@@ -2789,7 +2789,7 @@
   * Caller:  library/md.c
   *
   */
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-@@ -2804,7 +2804,7 @@
+@@ -2896,7 +2896,7 @@
   *
   * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
   */
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
-@@ -2904,7 +2904,7 @@
+@@ -2996,7 +2996,7 @@
   *
   * This module provides run-time version information.
   */
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@
  
  /**
   * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
-@@ -3014,7 +3014,7 @@
+@@ -3106,7 +3106,7 @@
   * Module:  library/xtea.c
   * Caller:
   */

package/libs/mbedtls/patches/300-soversion-compatibility.patch

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
  
  if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
      add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
--    set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.3 SOVERSION 3)
-+    set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.12.0 SOVERSION 1)
+-    set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.8 SOVERSION 3)
++    set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.8 SOVERSION 1)
      target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
  
      add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
      target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
  
      add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
--    set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.3 SOVERSION 12)
-+    set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.12.0 SOVERSION 10)
+-    set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.8 SOVERSION 12)
++    set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.8 SOVERSION 10)
      target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
  
      install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto

package/network/config/firewall/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=firewall
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=3
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/firewall3.git

package/network/config/firewall/patches/0001-zones-apply-tcp-mss-clamping-also-on-ingress-path.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From c9f48cb3bd0e14fec8ad71c3baef7c280a390b4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:52:59 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] zones: apply tcp mss clamping also on ingress path
+
+Fixes FS#3231
+
+Signed-off-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+(cherry picked from commit e9b90dfac2225927c035f6a76277b850c282dc9a)
+---
+ zones.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/zones.c b/zones.c
+index 505ab20..4656f88 100644
+--- a/zones.c
++++ b/zones.c
+@@ -553,6 +553,14 @@ print_interface_rule(struct fw3_ipt_handle *handle, struct fw3_state *state,
+ 			fw3_ipt_rule_target(r, "TCPMSS");
+ 			fw3_ipt_rule_addarg(r, false, "--clamp-mss-to-pmtu", NULL);
+ 			fw3_ipt_rule_replace(r, "FORWARD");
++
++			r = fw3_ipt_rule_create(handle, &tcp, dev, NULL, sub, NULL);
++			fw3_ipt_rule_addarg(r, false, "--tcp-flags", "SYN,RST");
++			fw3_ipt_rule_addarg(r, false, "SYN", NULL);
++			fw3_ipt_rule_comment(r, "Zone %s MTU fixing", zone->name);
++			fw3_ipt_rule_target(r, "TCPMSS");
++			fw3_ipt_rule_addarg(r, false, "--clamp-mss-to-pmtu", NULL);
++			fw3_ipt_rule_replace(r, "FORWARD");
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	else if (handle->table == FW3_TABLE_RAW)

package/network/config/firewall/patches/0002-options-fix-parsing-of-boolean-attributes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 78d52a28c66ad0fd2af250038fdcf4239ad37bf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Remi NGUYEN VAN <remi.nguyenvan+openwrt@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 13:50:27 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] options: fix parsing of boolean attributes
+
+Boolean attributes were parsed the same way as string attributes,
+so a value of { "bool_attr": "true" } would be parsed correctly, but
+{ "bool_attr": true } (without quotes) was parsed as false.
+
+Fixes FS#3284
+
+Signed-off-by: Remi NGUYEN VAN <remi.nguyenvan+openwrt@gmail.com>
+---
+ options.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/options.c
++++ b/options.c
+@@ -1170,6 +1170,9 @@ fw3_parse_blob_options(void *s, const st
+ 						if (blobmsg_type(e) == BLOBMSG_TYPE_INT32) {
+ 							snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", blobmsg_get_u32(e));
+ 							v = buf;
++						} else if (blobmsg_type(o) == BLOBMSG_TYPE_BOOL) {
++							snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", blobmsg_get_bool(o));
++							v = buf;
+ 						} else {
+ 							v = blobmsg_get_string(e);
+ 						}
+@@ -1189,6 +1192,9 @@ fw3_parse_blob_options(void *s, const st
+ 				if (blobmsg_type(o) == BLOBMSG_TYPE_INT32) {
+ 					snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", blobmsg_get_u32(o));
+ 					v = buf;
++				} else if (blobmsg_type(o) == BLOBMSG_TYPE_BOOL) {
++					snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", blobmsg_get_bool(o));
++					v = buf;
+ 				} else {
+ 					v = blobmsg_get_string(o);
+ 				}

package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile

@@ -88,9 +88,6 @@ DRIVER_MAKEOPTS= \
 	CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=$(HOSTAPD_IEEE80211AC) \
 	CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=$(CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT_SUPPORT) \
 
-space :=
-space +=
-
 ifeq ($(LOCAL_VARIANT),full)
   DRIVER_MAKEOPTS += CONFIG_IEEE80211W=$(CONFIG_DRIVER_11W_SUPPORT)
 endif

package/network/services/ppp/Makefile

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=ppp
 PKG_VERSION:=2.4.7
-PKG_RELEASE:=12
+PKG_RELEASE:=13
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://download.samba.org/pub/ppp/

package/network/services/ppp/patches/700-radius-Prevent-buffer-overflow-in-rc_mksid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 858976b1fc3107f1261aae337831959b511b83c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2020 12:01:32 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] radius: Prevent buffer overflow in rc_mksid()
+
+On some systems getpid() can return a value greater than 65535.
+Increase the size of buf[] to allow for this, and use slprintf()
+to make sure we never overflow it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+---
+ pppd/plugins/radius/util.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c b/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c
+index 6f976a712951..740131e8377c 100644
+--- a/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c
++++ b/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c
+@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ void rc_mdelay(int msecs)
+ char *
+ rc_mksid (void)
+ {
+-  static char buf[15];
++  static char buf[32];
+   static unsigned short int cnt = 0;
+-  sprintf (buf, "%08lX%04X%02hX",
++  slprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08lX%04X%02hX",
+ 	   (unsigned long int) time (NULL),
+ 	   (unsigned int) getpid (),
+ 	   cnt & 0xFF);

package/network/services/ppp/patches/701-pppd-Fix-bounds-check-in-EAP-code.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 8d7970b8f3db727fe798b65f3377fe6787575426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2020 15:53:28 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] pppd: Fix bounds check in EAP code
+
+Given that we have just checked vallen < len, it can never be the case
+that vallen >= len + sizeof(rhostname).  This fixes the check so we
+actually avoid overflowing the rhostname array.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+---
+ pppd/eap.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pppd/eap.c b/pppd/eap.c
+index 94407f56a336..1b93db01aebd 100644
+--- a/pppd/eap.c
++++ b/pppd/eap.c
+@@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@ int len;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/* Not so likely to happen. */
+-		if (vallen >= len + sizeof (rhostname)) {
++		if (len - vallen >= sizeof (rhostname)) {
+ 			dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down");
+ 			BCOPY(inp + vallen, rhostname, sizeof (rhostname) - 1);
+ 			rhostname[sizeof (rhostname) - 1] = '\0';
+@@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ int len;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/* Not so likely to happen. */
+-		if (vallen >= len + sizeof (rhostname)) {
++		if (len - vallen >= sizeof (rhostname)) {
+ 			dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down");
+ 			BCOPY(inp + vallen, rhostname, sizeof (rhostname) - 1);
+ 			rhostname[sizeof (rhostname) - 1] = '\0';

package/network/services/ppp/patches/702-pppd-Ignore-received-EAP-messages-when-not-doing-EAP.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 8d45443bb5c9372b4c6a362ba2f443d41c5636af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2020 16:31:42 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] pppd: Ignore received EAP messages when not doing EAP
+
+This adds some basic checks to the subroutines of eap_input to check
+that we have requested or agreed to doing EAP authentication before
+doing any processing on the received packet.  The motivation is to
+make it harder for a malicious peer to disrupt the operation of pppd
+by sending unsolicited EAP packets.  Note that eap_success() already
+has a check that the EAP client state is reasonable, and does nothing
+(apart from possibly printing a debug message) if not.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+---
+ pppd/eap.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/pppd/eap.c b/pppd/eap.c
+index 1b93db01aebd..082e95343120 100644
+--- a/pppd/eap.c
++++ b/pppd/eap.c
+@@ -1328,6 +1328,12 @@ int len;
+ 	int fd;
+ #endif /* USE_SRP */
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Ignore requests if we're not open
++	 */
++	if (esp->es_client.ea_state <= eapClosed)
++		return;
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Note: we update es_client.ea_id *only if* a Response
+ 	 * message is being generated.  Otherwise, we leave it the
+@@ -1736,6 +1742,12 @@ int len;
+ 	u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
+ #endif /* USE_SRP */
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Ignore responses if we're not open
++	 */
++	if (esp->es_server.ea_state <= eapClosed)
++		return;
++
+ 	if (esp->es_server.ea_id != id) {
+ 		dbglog("EAP: discarding Response %d; expected ID %d", id,
+ 		    esp->es_server.ea_id);
+@@ -2047,6 +2059,12 @@ u_char *inp;
+ int id;
+ int len;
+ {
++	/*
++	 * Ignore failure messages if we're not open
++	 */
++	if (esp->es_client.ea_state <= eapClosed)
++		return;
++
+ 	if (!eap_client_active(esp)) {
+ 		dbglog("EAP unexpected failure message in state %s (%d)",
+ 		    eap_state_name(esp->es_client.ea_state),

package/network/services/relayd/Makefile

@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=relayd
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/relayd.git
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
-PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2016-02-07
-PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=ad0b25ad74345d367c62311e14b279f5ccb8ef13
-PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=8818e9da8cc056961f21f1569e06e63b840965d1453dfcef70a8d84ea76f84d7
+PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2020-04-25
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=f4d759be54ceb37714e9a6ca320d5b50c95e9ce9
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=b1ff6e99072867be0975ba0be52ba9da3a876c8b8da893d68301e8238243a51e
 
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
 PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0

package/network/services/uhttpd/Makefile

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/uhttpd.git
-PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2019-12-22
-PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=5f9ae5738372aaa3a6be2f0a278933563d3f191a
-PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=16977c2d7e68f6db3241f874df625af9bd3bafa06fe4499ecb3561c825321e5d
+PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2020-02-12
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=2ee323c01079248baa9465969df9e25b5fb68cdf
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=ebec09286cf5f977cac893931a5a4f27ba891db88d5e44a9b0de9446ae431527
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
 PKG_LICENSE:=ISC
 

package/network/services/umdns/Makefile

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/mdnsd.git
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
-PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2018-01-02
-PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=78974417e182a3de8f78b7d73366ec0c98396b6c
-PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=a60f9eb9428ac3256cd7c3c6d4207c116cedf4d212b82e2f86c1bf7c7898fcbb
+PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2020-04-25
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=cdac0460ba50dc45735f0be2e19a5a8efc3dafe1
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=261cb929dfc03c1f293156cfdec8c2cd1541dcdc57ae42a323f9df5d26e6f7d2
 
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
 PKG_LICENSE:=LGPL-2.1
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ define Package/umdns
   DEPENDS:=+libubox +libubus +libblobmsg-json
 endef
 
-TARGET_CFLAGS += -I$(STAGING_DIR)/usr/include
+TARGET_CFLAGS += -I$(STAGING_DIR)/usr/include -Wno-address-of-packed-member
 
 define Package/umdns/conffiles
 /etc/config/umdns

package/network/services/wireguard/Makefile

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #
-# Copyright (C) 2016-2018 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+# Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
 # Copyright (C) 2016 Baptiste Jonglez <openwrt@bitsofnetworks.org>
 # Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Dan Luedtke <mail@danrl.com>
 #
@@ -11,17 +11,17 @@ include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=wireguard
 
-PKG_VERSION:=0.0.20190601
+PKG_VERSION:=1.0.20200611
 PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
-PKG_SOURCE:=WireGuard-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
-PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://git.zx2c4.com/WireGuard/snapshot/
-PKG_HASH:=7528461824a0174bd7d4f15e68d8f0ce9a8ea318411502b80759438e8ef65568
+PKG_SOURCE:=wireguard-linux-compat-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux-compat/snapshot/
+PKG_HASH:=9b0478c3b1f3a7b488916e632e2fcbb1383bb1a2ef294489858ce2ba1da3246d
 
-PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0 Apache-2.0
+PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
 PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
 
-PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(KERNEL_BUILD_DIR)/WireGuard-$(PKG_VERSION)
+PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(KERNEL_BUILD_DIR)/wireguard-linux-compat-$(PKG_VERSION)
 PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
 PKG_USE_MIPS16:=0
 
@@ -57,13 +57,8 @@ endef
 include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel-defaults.mk
 include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package-defaults.mk
 
-# Used by Build/Compile/Default
-MAKE_PATH:=src/tools
-MAKE_VARS += PLATFORM=linux
-
 define Build/Compile
 	$(MAKE) $(KERNEL_MAKEOPTS) M="$(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/src" modules
-	$(call Build/Compile/Default)
 endef
 
 define Package/wireguard/install
@@ -74,27 +69,6 @@ define Package/wireguard/description
   $(call Package/wireguard/Default/description)
 endef
 
-define Package/wireguard-tools
-  $(call Package/wireguard/Default)
-  TITLE:=WireGuard userspace control program (wg)
-  DEPENDS:=+libmnl +ip
-endef
-
-define Package/wireguard-tools/description
-  $(call Package/wireguard/Default/description)
-
-  This package provides the userspace control program for WireGuard,
-  `wg(8)`, a netifd protocol helper, and a re-resolve watchdog script.
-endef
-
-define Package/wireguard-tools/install
-	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/usr/bin/
-	$(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/src/tools/wg $(1)/usr/bin/
-	$(INSTALL_BIN) ./files/wireguard_watchdog $(1)/usr/bin/
-	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/lib/netifd/proto/
-	$(INSTALL_BIN) ./files/wireguard.sh $(1)/lib/netifd/proto/
-endef
-
 define KernelPackage/wireguard
   SECTION:=kernel
   CATEGORY:=Kernel modules
@@ -112,5 +86,4 @@ define KernelPackage/wireguard/description
 endef
 
 $(eval $(call BuildPackage,wireguard))
-$(eval $(call BuildPackage,wireguard-tools))
 $(eval $(call KernelPackage,wireguard))

package/network/utils/ethtool/Makefile

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ PKG_FIXUP:=autoreconf
 PKG_INSTALL:=1
 PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
 
-PKG_CONFIG_DEPENDS:=ETHTOOL_PRETTY_DUMP
+PKG_CONFIG_DEPENDS:=CONFIG_ETHTOOL_PRETTY_DUMP
 
 include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
 

package/network/utils/wireguard-tools/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+# Copyright (C) 2016 Baptiste Jonglez <openwrt@bitsofnetworks.org>
+# Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Dan Luedtke <mail@danrl.com>
+#
+# This is free software, licensed under the GNU General Public License v2.
+# See /LICENSE for more information.
+
+include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
+include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel.mk
+
+PKG_NAME:=wireguard-tools
+
+PKG_VERSION:=1.0.20191226
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
+
+PKG_SOURCE:=wireguard-tools-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/
+PKG_HASH:=aa8af0fdc9872d369d8c890a84dbc2a2466b55795dccd5b47721b2d97644b04f
+
+PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
+PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
+
+PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
+PKG_USE_MIPS16:=0
+
+include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
+include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package-defaults.mk
+
+MAKE_PATH:=src
+MAKE_VARS += PLATFORM=linux
+
+define Package/wireguard-tools
+  $(call Package/wireguard/Default)
+  TITLE:=WireGuard userspace control program (wg)
+  DEPENDS:=+libmnl +ip
+endef
+
+define Package/wireguard-tools/description
+  $(call Package/wireguard/Default/description)
+
+  This package provides the userspace control program for WireGuard,
+  `wg(8)`, a netifd protocol helper, and a re-resolve watchdog script.
+endef
+
+define Package/wireguard-tools/install
+	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/usr/bin/
+	$(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/src/wg $(1)/usr/bin/
+	$(INSTALL_BIN) ./files/wireguard_watchdog $(1)/usr/bin/
+	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/lib/netifd/proto/
+	$(INSTALL_BIN) ./files/wireguard.sh $(1)/lib/netifd/proto/
+endef
+
+$(eval $(call BuildPackage,wireguard-tools))

package/system/ca-certificates/Makefile

@@ -7,14 +7,14 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=ca-certificates
-PKG_VERSION:=20190110
+PKG_VERSION:=20200601
 PKG_RELEASE:=1
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)_$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://ftp.debian.org/debian/pool/main/c/ca-certificates
-PKG_HASH:=ee4bf0f4c6398005f5b5ca4e0b87b82837ac5c3b0280a1cb3a63c47555c3a675
-
+PKG_HASH:=43766d5a436519503dfd65ab83488ae33ab4d4ca3d0993797b58c92eb9ed4e63
+PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/work
 PKG_INSTALL:=1
 
 include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk

package/system/fstools/Makefile

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=fstools
-PKG_RELEASE:=5
+PKG_RELEASE:=6
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/fstools.git

package/system/fstools/patches/000-fix-ntfs-uuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From d05276dc1d6de119da518d62930b9a8ef55ef7e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2019 10:48:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] libblkid-tiny: ntfs: fix use-after-free
+
+The memory pointed to by ns can be reallocated when checking mft records
+
+Fixes FS#2129
+
+Signed-off-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
+---
+ libblkid-tiny/ntfs.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/libblkid-tiny/ntfs.c
++++ b/libblkid-tiny/ntfs.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int probe_ntfs(blkid_probe pr, co
+ 
+ 	uint32_t sectors_per_cluster, mft_record_size;
+ 	uint16_t sector_size;
++	uint64_t volume_serial;
+ 	uint64_t nr_clusters, off; //, attr_off;
+ 	unsigned char *buf_mft;
+ 
+@@ -148,15 +149,16 @@ static int probe_ntfs(blkid_probe pr, co
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+ 
++	volume_serial = ns->volume_serial;
+ 	off = le64_to_cpu(ns->mft_cluster_location) * sector_size *
+ 		sectors_per_cluster;
+ 
+ 	DBG(LOWPROBE, ul_debug("NTFS: sector_size=%"PRIu16", mft_record_size=%"PRIu32", "
+ 			"sectors_per_cluster=%"PRIu32", nr_clusters=%"PRIu64" "
+-			"cluster_offset=%"PRIu64"",
++			"cluster_offset=%"PRIu64", volume_serial=%"PRIu64"",
+ 			sector_size, mft_record_size,
+ 			sectors_per_cluster, nr_clusters,
+-			off));
++			off, volume_serial));
+ 
+ 	buf_mft = blkid_probe_get_buffer(pr, off, mft_record_size);
+ 	if (!buf_mft)
+@@ -207,9 +209,9 @@ static int probe_ntfs(blkid_probe pr, co
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	blkid_probe_sprintf_uuid(pr,
+-			(unsigned char *) &ns->volume_serial,
+-			sizeof(ns->volume_serial),
+-			"%016" PRIX64, le64_to_cpu(ns->volume_serial));
++			(unsigned char *) &volume_serial,
++			sizeof(volume_serial),
++			"%016" PRIX64, le64_to_cpu(volume_serial));
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 

package/system/opkg/Makefile

@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ PKG_FLAGS:=essential
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://git.openwrt.org/project/opkg-lede.git
-PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2019-06-14
-PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=dcbc142e51f5f5f2fb9e4e44657e013d3c36a52b
-PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=fca7e71dd06f0d5ee0af0d0a493d641d4d5d7e403d64c67879a462a020aa2299
+PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2020-01-25
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=c09fe2098718807ddbca13ee36e3e38801822946
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=b2fba519fb3bf2da2e325a33eee951b85c7c1886e48ebaac3892435a71ae33d5
 
 PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
 PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING

package/system/rpcd/Makefile

@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=rpcd
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/rpcd.git
-PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2018-11-28
-PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=3aa81d0dfae167eccc26203bd0c96f3e3450f253
+PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2020-05-26
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=7be1f17138f19d1d7a86e0c27b3662d3643ff296
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
-PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=1befc5e1793a687e7a37b4f4d611e5f95aef4b79ad4b288c4dcb4c74d212509b
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=b427b2be8ebd486edbc88f6e789d1890cbdda1b4f04dcfcc8751f568c3a82674
 
 PKG_LICENSE:=ISC
 PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=

package/system/uci/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=uci
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
 
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/uci.git
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git

package/system/uci/patches/001-file-uci_parse_package-fix-heap-use-after-free.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From a3e650911f5e6f67dcff09974df3775dfd615da6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0tetiar?= <ynezz@true.cz>
+Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 01:29:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] file: uci_parse_package: fix heap use after free
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Fixes following issue which is caused by usage of pointer which pointed
+to a reallocated address:
+
+ ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x619000000087 at pc 0x000000509aa7 bp 0x7ffd6b9c3c40 sp 0x7ffd6b9c3400
+ READ of size 2 at 0x619000000087 thread T0
+     #0 0x509aa6 in strdup (test-fuzz+0x509aa6)
+     #1 0x7fc36d2a1636 in uci_strdup util.c:60:8
+     #2 0x7fc36d29e1ac in uci_alloc_generic list.c:55:13
+     #3 0x7fc36d29e241 in uci_alloc_package list.c:253:6
+     #4 0x7fc36d2a0ba3 in uci_switch_config file.c:375:18
+     #5 0x7fc36d2a09b8 in uci_parse_package file.c:397:2
+     #6 0x7fc36d2a09b8 in uci_parse_line file.c:513:6
+     #7 0x7fc36d2a09b8 in uci_import file.c:681:4
+
+ 0x619000000087 is located 7 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [0x619000000080,0x619000000480)
+ freed by thread T0 here:
+     #0 0x51daa9 in realloc (test-fuzz+0x51daa9)
+     #1 0x7fc36d2a1612 in uci_realloc util.c:49:8
+
+ previously allocated by thread T0 here:
+     #0 0x51daa9 in realloc (test-fuzz+0x51daa9)
+     #1 0x7fc36d2a1612 in uci_realloc util.c:49:8
+
+Reported-by: Jeremy Galindo <jgalindo@datto.com>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ file.c                                             |   2 +-
+ ...sig-06,src-000079,time-22005942,op-ext_AO,pos-8 | Bin 0 -> 56 bytes
+ 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/fuzz/corpus/id-000000,sig-06,src-000079,time-22005942,op-ext_AO,pos-8
+
+--- a/file.c
++++ b/file.c
+@@ -387,8 +387,8 @@ static void uci_parse_package(struct uci
+ 	pctx->pos += strlen(pctx_cur_str(pctx)) + 1;
+ 
+ 	ofs_name = next_arg(ctx, true, true, true);
+-	name = pctx_str(pctx, ofs_name);
+ 	assert_eol(ctx);
++	name = pctx_str(pctx, ofs_name);
+ 	if (single)
+ 		return;
+ 

package/system/uci/patches/002-file-Check-buffer-size-after-strtok.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From eae126f66663e5c73e5d290b8e3134449489340f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
+Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2020 17:14:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] file: Check buffer size after strtok()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This fixes a heap overflow in the parsing of the uci line.
+
+The line which is parsed and put into pctx->buf is null terminated and
+stored on the heap. In the uci_parse_line() function we use strtok() to
+split this string in multiple parts after divided by a space or tab.
+strtok() replaces these characters with a NULL byte. If the next byte is
+NULL we assume that this NULL byte was added by strtok() and try to
+parse the string after this NULL byte. If this NULL byte was not added
+by strtok(), but by fgets() to mark the end of the string we would read
+over this end of the string in uninitialized memory and later over the
+allocated buffer.
+
+Fix this problem by storing how long the line we read was and check if
+we would read over the end of the string here.
+
+This also adds the input which detected this crash to the corpus of the
+fuzzer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
+[fixed merge conflict in tests]
+Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
+---
+ file.c                                        | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
+ tests/cram/test-san_uci_import.t              |  1 +
+ tests/cram/test_uci_import.t                  |  1 +
+ .../2e18ecc3a759dedc9357b1298e9269eccc5c5a6b  |  1 +
+ uci_internal.h                                |  1 +
+ 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/fuzz/corpus/2e18ecc3a759dedc9357b1298e9269eccc5c5a6b
+
+--- a/file.c
++++ b/file.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include <glob.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
+ 
+ #include "uci.h"
+ #include "uci_internal.h"
+@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ __private void uci_getln(struct uci_cont
+ 			return;
+ 
+ 		ofs += strlen(p);
++		pctx->buf_filled = ofs;
+ 		if (pctx->buf[ofs - 1] == '\n') {
+ 			pctx->line++;
+ 			return;
+@@ -120,6 +122,15 @@ static inline void addc(struct uci_conte
+ 	*pos_src += 1;
+ }
+ 
++static int uci_increase_pos(struct uci_parse_context *pctx, size_t add)
++{
++	if (pctx->pos + add > pctx->buf_filled)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	pctx->pos += add;
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * parse a double quoted string argument from the command line
+  */
+@@ -384,7 +395,8 @@ static void uci_parse_package(struct uci
+ 	char *name;
+ 
+ 	/* command string null-terminated by strtok */
+-	pctx->pos += strlen(pctx_cur_str(pctx)) + 1;
++	if (uci_increase_pos(pctx, strlen(pctx_cur_str(pctx)) + 1))
++		uci_parse_error(ctx, "package without name");
+ 
+ 	ofs_name = next_arg(ctx, true, true, true);
+ 	assert_eol(ctx);
+@@ -416,7 +428,8 @@ static void uci_parse_config(struct uci_
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* command string null-terminated by strtok */
+-	pctx->pos += strlen(pctx_cur_str(pctx)) + 1;
++	if (uci_increase_pos(pctx, strlen(pctx_cur_str(pctx)) + 1))
++		uci_parse_error(ctx, "config without name");
+ 
+ 	ofs_type = next_arg(ctx, true, false, false);
+ 	type = pctx_str(pctx, ofs_type);
+@@ -466,7 +479,8 @@ static void uci_parse_option(struct uci_
+ 		uci_parse_error(ctx, "option/list command found before the first section");
+ 
+ 	/* command string null-terminated by strtok */
+-	pctx->pos += strlen(pctx_cur_str(pctx)) + 1;
++	if (uci_increase_pos(pctx, strlen(pctx_cur_str(pctx)) + 1))
++		uci_parse_error(ctx, "option without name");
+ 
+ 	ofs_name = next_arg(ctx, true, true, false);
+ 	ofs_value = next_arg(ctx, false, false, false);
+--- a/uci_internal.h
++++ b/uci_internal.h
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct uci_parse_context
+ 	const char *name;
+ 	char *buf;
+ 	int bufsz;
++	size_t buf_filled;
+ 	int pos;
+ };
+ #define pctx_pos(pctx)		((pctx)->pos)

package/system/usign/Makefile

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/usign.git
-PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2019-08-06
-PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=5a52b379902471cef495687547c7b568142f66d2
-PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=9779f6d6718a7f7cd3e28aa7feefc9b3f4b0c7a85cb58ff18afbeb6b4372177a
+PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2020-05-23
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=f1f65026a94137c91b5466b149ef3ea3f20091e9
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=3f6569a5e63fdfd032976ac0f79d736d3935101ac1b97fb370514b013c5e6bb6
 CMAKE_INSTALL:=1
 PKG_CHECK_FORMAT_SECURITY:=1
 PKG_USE_MIPS16:=0

package/utils/lua/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=lua
 PKG_VERSION:=5.1.5
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://www.lua.org/ftp/ \

package/utils/lua/patches-host/013-lnum-strtoul-parsing-fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+diff --git a/src/lnum.c b/src/lnum.c
+index 1456b6a2ed23..b0632b04c2b7 100644
+--- a/src/lnum.c
++++ b/src/lnum.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ static int luaO_str2i (const char *s, lua_Integer *res, char **endptr_ref) {
+ #else
+       return 0;  /* Reject the number */
+ #endif
++    } else if (v > LUA_INTEGER_MAX) {
++      return TK_NUMBER;
+     }
+   } else if ((v > LUA_INTEGER_MAX) || (*endptr && (!isspace(*endptr)))) {
+     return TK_NUMBER;	/* not in signed range, or has '.', 'e' etc. trailing */
+@@ -310,3 +312,13 @@ int try_unmint( lua_Integer *r, lua_Integer ib ) {
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef LONG_OVERFLOW_LUA_INTEGER
++unsigned LUA_INTEGER lua_str2ul( const char *str, char **endptr, int base ) {
++  unsigned long v= strtoul(str, endptr, base);
++  if ( v > LUA_INTEGER_MAX ) {
++    errno= ERANGE;
++    v= ULONG_MAX;
++  }
++  return (unsigned LUA_INTEGER)v;
++}
++#endif
+diff --git a/src/lnum_config.h b/src/lnum_config.h
+index 19d7a4231a49..1092eead6629 100644
+--- a/src/lnum_config.h
++++ b/src/lnum_config.h
+@@ -141,7 +141,12 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef lua_str2ul
+-# define lua_str2ul (unsigned LUA_INTEGER)strtoul
++# if LONG_MAX > LUA_INTEGER_MAX
++#   define LONG_OVERFLOW_LUA_INTEGER
++    unsigned LUA_INTEGER lua_str2ul( const char *str, char **endptr, int base );
++# else
++#  define lua_str2ul (unsigned LUA_INTEGER)strtoul
++# endif
+ #endif
+ #ifndef LUA_INTEGER_MIN
+ # define LUA_INTEGER_MIN (-LUA_INTEGER_MAX -1)  /* -2^16|32 */
+-- 
+1.9.1
+

package/utils/lua/patches/013-lnum-strtoul-parsing-fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+--- a/src/lnum.c
++++ b/src/lnum.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ static int luaO_str2i (const char *s, lu
+ #else
+       return 0;  /* Reject the number */
+ #endif
++    } else if (v > LUA_INTEGER_MAX) {
++      return TK_NUMBER;
+     }
+   } else if ((v > LUA_INTEGER_MAX) || (*endptr && (!isspace(*endptr)))) {
+     return TK_NUMBER;	/* not in signed range, or has '.', 'e' etc. trailing */
+@@ -310,3 +312,13 @@ int try_unmint( lua_Integer *r, lua_Inte
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef LONG_OVERFLOW_LUA_INTEGER
++unsigned LUA_INTEGER lua_str2ul( const char *str, char **endptr, int base ) {
++  unsigned long v= strtoul(str, endptr, base);
++  if ( v > LUA_INTEGER_MAX ) {
++    errno= ERANGE;
++    v= ULONG_MAX;
++  }
++  return (unsigned LUA_INTEGER)v;
++}
++#endif
+--- a/src/lnum_config.h
++++ b/src/lnum_config.h
+@@ -141,7 +141,12 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef lua_str2ul
+-# define lua_str2ul (unsigned LUA_INTEGER)strtoul
++# if LONG_MAX > LUA_INTEGER_MAX
++#   define LONG_OVERFLOW_LUA_INTEGER
++    unsigned LUA_INTEGER lua_str2ul( const char *str, char **endptr, int base );
++# else
++#  define lua_str2ul (unsigned LUA_INTEGER)strtoul
++# endif
+ #endif
+ #ifndef LUA_INTEGER_MIN
+ # define LUA_INTEGER_MIN (-LUA_INTEGER_MAX -1)  /* -2^16|32 */

scripts/getver.sh

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ try_git() {
 	*)
 		BRANCH="$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)"
 		ORIGIN="$(git rev-parse --verify --symbolic-full-name ${BRANCH}@{u} 2>/dev/null)"
-		[ -n "$ORIGIN" ] || ORIGIN="$(git rev-parse --verify --symbolic-full-name master@{u} 2>/dev/null)"
+		[ -n "$ORIGIN" ] || ORIGIN="$(git rev-parse --verify --symbolic-full-name openwrt-18.06@{u} 2>/dev/null)"
 		REV="$(git rev-list ${REBOOT}..$GET_REV | wc -l | awk '{print $1}')"
 
 		if [ -n "$ORIGIN" ]; then

target/linux/apm821xx/patches-4.14/023-0007-crypto-crypto4xx-Fix-wrong-ppc4xx_trng_probe-ppc4xx_.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 6e88098ca43a3d80ae86908f7badba683c8a0d84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:24:18 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 07/15] crypto: crypto4xx - Fix wrong
- ppc4xx_trng_probe()/ppc4xx_trng_remove() arguments
-
-When building without CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_PPC4XX, I hit the following build failure:
-drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c: In function 'crypto4xx_probe':
-drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c:1407:20: error: passing argument 1 of 'ppc4xx_trng_probe' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
-In file included from drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c:50:0:
-drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_trng.h:28:20: note: expected 'struct crypto4xx_device *' but argument is of type 'struct crypto4xx_core_device *'
-drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c: In function 'crypto4xx_remove':
-drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c:1434:21: error: passing argument 1 of 'ppc4xx_trng_remove' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
-In file included from drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c:50:0:
-drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_trng.h:30:20: note: expected 'struct crypto4xx_device *' but argument is of type 'struct crypto4xx_core_device *'
-
-This patch fix the needed argument of ppc4xx_trng_probe()/ppc4xx_trng_remove() in that case.
-
-Fixes: 5343e674f32f ("crypto4xx: integrate ppc4xx-rng into crypto4xx")
-Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
-Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
----
- drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_trng.h | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_trng.h
-+++ b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_trng.h
-@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ void ppc4xx_trng_probe(struct crypto4xx_
- void ppc4xx_trng_remove(struct crypto4xx_core_device *core_dev);
- #else
- static inline void ppc4xx_trng_probe(
--	struct crypto4xx_device *dev __maybe_unused) { }
-+	struct crypto4xx_core_device *dev __maybe_unused) { }
- static inline void ppc4xx_trng_remove(
--	struct crypto4xx_device *dev __maybe_unused) { }
-+	struct crypto4xx_core_device *dev __maybe_unused) { }
- #endif
- 
- #endif

target/linux/apm821xx/patches-4.14/301-fix-memory-map-wndr4700.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/pci.c
 +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/pci.c
-@@ -1905,9 +1905,9 @@ static void __init ppc4xx_configure_pcie
+@@ -1903,9 +1903,9 @@ static void __init ppc4xx_configure_pcie
  		 * if it works
  		 */
  		out_le32(mbase + PECFG_PIM0LAL, 0x00000000);

target/linux/apm821xx/patches-4.14/801-usb-xhci-add-firmware-loader-for-uPD720201-and-uPD72.patch

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>
  
  #include "xhci.h"
  #include "xhci-trace.h"
-@@ -266,6 +268,458 @@ static void xhci_pme_acpi_rtd3_enable(st
+@@ -276,6 +278,458 @@ static void xhci_pme_acpi_rtd3_enable(st
  static void xhci_pme_acpi_rtd3_enable(struct pci_dev *dev) { }
  #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI */
  
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>
  /* called during probe() after chip reset completes */
  static int xhci_pci_setup(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
  {
-@@ -301,6 +755,22 @@ static int xhci_pci_probe(struct pci_dev
+@@ -314,6 +768,22 @@ static int xhci_pci_probe(struct pci_dev
  	struct hc_driver *driver;
  	struct usb_hcd *hcd;
  
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>
  	driver = (struct hc_driver *)id->driver_data;
  
  	/* For some HW implementation, a XHCI reset is just not enough... */
-@@ -365,6 +835,16 @@ static void xhci_pci_remove(struct pci_d
+@@ -375,6 +845,16 @@ static void xhci_pci_remove(struct pci_d
  {
  	struct xhci_hcd *xhci;
  

target/linux/apm821xx/patches-4.14/802-usb-xhci-force-msi-renesas-xhci.patch

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ produce a noisy warning.
 
 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
 +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
-@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct devic
+@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct devic
  		xhci->quirks |= XHCI_TRUST_TX_LENGTH;
  	if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_RENESAS &&
  			pdev->device == 0x0015)

target/linux/ar7/patches-4.9/300-add-ac49x-platform.patch

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
  
  config ATH25
  	bool "Atheros AR231x/AR531x SoC support"
-@@ -1007,6 +1007,7 @@ config MIPS_PARAVIRT
+@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ config MIPS_PARAVIRT
  endchoice
  
  source "arch/mips/alchemy/Kconfig"

target/linux/ar71xx/base-files/etc/board.d/02_network

@@ -237,6 +237,8 @@ ar71xx_setup_interfaces()
 			"0@eth1" "2:lan" "3:lan" "4:lan" "5:lan" "6@eth0" "1:wan"
 		;;
 	archer-c25-v1|\
+	archer-c60-v1|\
+	archer-c60-v2|\
 	rb-750-r2|\
 	rb-750p-pbr2|\
 	rb-750up-r2|\
@@ -253,12 +255,6 @@ ar71xx_setup_interfaces()
 		ucidef_add_switch "switch0" \
 			"0@eth1" "1:lan:1" "2:lan:4" "3:lan:3" "4:lan:2"
 		;;
-	archer-c60-v1|\
-	archer-c60-v2)
-		ucidef_set_interfaces_lan_wan "eth1.1" "eth0"
-		ucidef_add_switch "switch0" \
-			"0@eth1" "1:lan:1" "2:lan:2" "3:lan:3" "4:lan:4"
-		;;
 	arduino-yun|\
 	dir-505-a1|\
 	tl-wa801nd-v3)

target/linux/ar71xx/base-files/etc/hotplug.d/firmware/11-ath10k-caldata

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ case "$FIRMWARE" in
 		ath10kcal_extract "art" 20480 12064
 		ln -sf /lib/firmware/ath10k/pre-cal-pci-0000\:00\:00.0.bin \
 			/lib/firmware/ath10k/QCA9888/hw2.0/board.bin
-		ath10kcal_patch_mac $(macaddr_add $(cat /sys/class/net/eth0/address) -1)
+		ath10kcal_patch_mac $(macaddr_add $(cat /sys/class/net/eth1/address) -1)
 		;;
 	cf-e385ac)
 		ath10kcal_extract "art" 20480 12064

target/linux/ar71xx/base-files/etc/hotplug.d/ieee80211/10_fix_wifi_mac

@@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ board=$(board_name)
 case "$board" in
 	archer-c58-v1|\
 	archer-c59-v1|\
-	archer-c60-v1|\
-	archer-c60-v2)
+	archer-c60-v1)
 		echo $(macaddr_add $(mtd_get_mac_binary mac 8)  $(($PHYNBR - 1)) ) > /sys${DEVPATH}/macaddress
 		;;
 	*)

target/linux/ar71xx/base-files/lib/upgrade/platform.sh

@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ platform_check_image() {
 	archer-c60-v2|\
 	archer-c7-v4|\
 	archer-c7-v5|\
+	arduino-yun|\
 	bullet-m|\
 	c-55|\
 	carambola2|\
@@ -343,7 +344,6 @@ platform_check_image() {
 	ap152|\
 	ap91-5g|\
 	ap96|\
-	arduino-yun|\
 	bhr-4grv2|\
 	bxu2000n-2-a1|\
 	db120|\

target/linux/ar71xx/files/arch/mips/ath79/mach-archer-c60-v1.c

@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static void __init archer_c60_v1_setup(void)
 	ath79_register_mdio(0, 0x0);
 	ath79_register_mdio(1, 0x0);
 
-	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth0_data.mac_addr, mac, 0);
-	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth1_data.mac_addr, mac, 1);
+	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth1_data.mac_addr, mac, 0);
+	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth0_data.mac_addr, mac, 1);
 
 	/* WAN port */
 	ath79_eth0_data.phy_if_mode = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_MII;
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ static void __init archer_c60_v2_setup(void)
 	ath79_register_mdio(0, 0x0);
 	ath79_register_mdio(1, 0x0);
 
-	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth0_data.mac_addr, mac, 0);
-	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth1_data.mac_addr, mac, 1);
+	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth1_data.mac_addr, mac, 0);
+	ath79_init_mac(ath79_eth0_data.mac_addr, mac, 1);
 
 	/* WAN port */
 	ath79_eth0_data.phy_if_mode = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_MII;

target/linux/ar71xx/files/arch/mips/ath79/mach-arduino-yun.c

@@ -117,8 +117,7 @@ static void __init ds_setup(void)
 	ath79_gpio_function_disable(AR933X_GPIO_FUNC_ETH_SWITCH_LED0_EN |
 								AR933X_GPIO_FUNC_ETH_SWITCH_LED1_EN |
 								AR933X_GPIO_FUNC_ETH_SWITCH_LED2_EN |
-								AR933X_GPIO_FUNC_ETH_SWITCH_LED3_EN |
-								AR933X_GPIO_FUNC_ETH_SWITCH_LED4_EN);
+								AR933X_GPIO_FUNC_ETH_SWITCH_LED3_EN);
 
 	//Disable the Function for some pins to have GPIO functionality active
 	// GPIO6-7-8 and GPIO11

target/linux/ar71xx/files/arch/mips/ath79/mach-ew-dorin.c

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static struct gpio_keys_button dorin_gpio_keys[] __initdata = {
 		.code		= KEY_WPS_BUTTON,
 		.debounce_interval = DORIN_KEYS_DEBOUNCE_INTERVAL,
 		.gpio		= DORIN_GPIO_BTN_JUMPSTART,
-		.active_low	= 1,
+		.active_low	= 0,
 	},
 	{
 		.desc		= "reset button",

target/linux/ar71xx/files/arch/mips/ath79/mach-nbg6716.c

@@ -198,11 +198,11 @@ static struct gpio_keys_button nbg6616_gpio_keys[] __initdata = {
 	},
 	{
 		.desc		= "RFKILL button",
-		.type		= EV_KEY,
+		.type		= EV_SW,
 		.code		= KEY_RFKILL,
 		.debounce_interval = NBG6716_KEYS_DEBOUNCE_INTERVAL,
 		.gpio		= NBG6716_GPIO_BTN_RFKILL,
-		.active_low	= 1,
+		.active_low	= 0,
 	},
 	{
 		.desc		= "WPS button",

target/linux/ar71xx/files/arch/mips/ath79/routerboot.c

@@ -206,10 +206,7 @@ __rb_get_wlan_data(u16 id)
 		u8 *erd_data;
 		u16 erd_len;
 
-		if (id == 0)
-			goto err_free;
-
-		err = routerboot_find_tag(tag, tag_len, id,
+		err = routerboot_find_tag(tag, tag_len, 0x1,
 					  &erd_data, &erd_len);
 		if (err) {
 			pr_err("no ERD data found for id %u\n", id);
@@ -224,9 +221,6 @@ __rb_get_wlan_data(u16 id)
 			goto err_free;
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (id != 0)
-			goto err_free;
-
 		err = rle_decode((char *) tag, tag_len, buf, RB_ART_SIZE,
 				 &src_done, &dst_done);
 		if (err) {

target/linux/ar71xx/files/drivers/mtd/nand/ar934x_nfc.c

@@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ ar934x_nfc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	nfc = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 	if (nfc) {
 		mtd = ar934x_nfc_to_mtd(nfc);
-		nand_release(mtd);
+		nand_release(&nfc->nand_chip);
 		ar934x_nfc_free_buf(nfc);
 		free_irq(nfc->irq, nfc);
 	}

target/linux/ar71xx/files/drivers/mtd/nand/rb4xx_nand.c

@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static int rb4xx_nand_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 
 err_release_nand:
-	nand_release(mtd);
+	nand_release(&info->chip);
 err_set_drvdata:
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
 err_free_info:
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int rb4xx_nand_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct rb4xx_nand_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
-	nand_release(rbinfo_to_mtd(info));
+	nand_release(&info->chip);
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
 	kfree(info);
 	gpio_free(RB4XX_NAND_GPIO_NCE);

target/linux/ar71xx/files/drivers/mtd/nand/rb750_nand.c

@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static int rb750_nand_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 
 err_release_nand:
-	nand_release(mtd);
+	nand_release(&info->chip);
 err_set_drvdata:
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
 err_free_info:
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int rb750_nand_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct rb750_nand_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
-	nand_release(rbinfo_to_mtd(info));
+	nand_release(&info->chip);
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
 	kfree(info);
 

target/linux/ar71xx/files/drivers/mtd/nand/rb91x_nand.c

@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int rb91x_nand_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 
 err_release_nand:
-	nand_release(mtd);
+	nand_release(&rbni->chip);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static int rb91x_nand_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct rb91x_nand_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
-	nand_release(rbinfo_to_mtd(info));
+	nand_release(&info->chip);
 
 	return 0;
 }

target/linux/ar71xx/image/generic.mk

@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ define Device/NBG6616
   BOARDNAME := NBG6616
   KERNEL_SIZE := 2048k
   IMAGE_SIZE := 15323k
-  MTDPARTS := spi0.0:192k(u-boot)ro,64k(env)ro,64k(RFdata)ro,384k(zyxel_rfsd),384k(romd),64k(header),2048k(kernel),13184k(rootfs),15232k@0x120000(firmware)
+  MTDPARTS := spi0.0:192k(u-boot)ro,64k(env),64k(RFdata)ro,384k(zyxel_rfsd),384k(romd),64k(header),2048k(kernel),13184k(rootfs),15232k@0x120000(firmware)
   CMDLINE += mem=128M
   IMAGES := sysupgrade.bin
   KERNEL := kernel-bin | patch-cmdline | lzma | uImage lzma | jffs2 boot/vmlinux.lzma.uImage

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/403-mtd_fix_cfi_cmdset_0002_status_check.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c
 +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c
-@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword(str
+@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword(str
  		}
  
  		if (chip_good(map, adr, datum))
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  
  		/* Latency issues. Drop the lock, wait a while and retry */
  		UDELAY(map, chip, adr, 1);
-@@ -1654,6 +1654,8 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword(str
+@@ -1653,6 +1653,8 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword(str
  			goto retry;
  		}
  	}
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  	xip_enable(map, chip, adr);
   op_done:
  	if (mode == FL_OTP_WRITE)
-@@ -2232,7 +2234,6 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_panic_write(struct
+@@ -2235,7 +2237,6 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_panic_write(struct
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
  /*
   * Handle devices with one erase region, that only implement
   * the chip erase command.
-@@ -2300,7 +2301,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct
+@@ -2303,7 +2304,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct
  		}
  
  		if (chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map)))
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  
  		if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) {
  			printk(KERN_WARNING "MTD %s(): software timeout\n",
-@@ -2324,6 +2325,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct
+@@ -2327,6 +2328,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
  	chip->state = FL_READY;
  	xip_enable(map, chip, adr);
  	DISABLE_VPP(map);
-@@ -2397,7 +2399,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(st
+@@ -2400,7 +2402,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(st
  
  		if (chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) {
  			xip_enable(map, chip, adr);
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
  		}
  
  		if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) {
-@@ -2423,6 +2425,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(st
+@@ -2426,6 +2428,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(st
  		}
  	}
  

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/411-mtd-cfi_cmdset_0002-force-word-write.patch

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  
  /* Atmel chips don't use the same PRI format as AMD chips */
  static void fixup_convert_atmel_pri(struct mtd_info *mtd)
-@@ -1796,6 +1800,7 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_write_words(struct
+@@ -1795,6 +1799,7 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_write_words(struct
  /*
   * FIXME: interleaved mode not tested, and probably not supported!
   */
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
  static int __xipram do_write_buffer(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip,
  				    unsigned long adr, const u_char *buf,
  				    int len)
-@@ -1924,7 +1929,6 @@ static int __xipram do_write_buffer(stru
+@@ -1927,7 +1932,6 @@ static int __xipram do_write_buffer(stru
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
  static int cfi_amdstd_write_buffers(struct mtd_info *mtd, loff_t to, size_t len,
  				    size_t *retlen, const u_char *buf)
  {
-@@ -1999,6 +2003,7 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_write_buffers(stru
+@@ -2002,6 +2006,7 @@ static int cfi_amdstd_write_buffers(stru
  
  	return 0;
  }

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/450-gpio-nxp-74hc153-gpio-chip-driver.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
 +++ b/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
-@@ -1214,4 +1214,12 @@ config GPIO_VIPERBOARD
+@@ -1215,4 +1215,12 @@ config GPIO_VIPERBOARD
  
  endmenu
  

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/451-gpio-74x164-improve-platform-device-support.patch

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
 +#endif
 --- a/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
 +++ b/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
-@@ -1155,7 +1155,6 @@ menu "SPI GPIO expanders"
+@@ -1156,7 +1156,6 @@ menu "SPI GPIO expanders"
  
  config GPIO_74X164
  	tristate "74x164 serial-in/parallel-out 8-bits shift register"

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/452-gpio-add-gpio-latch-driver.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
 +++ b/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
-@@ -1221,4 +1221,9 @@ config GPIO_NXP_74HC153
+@@ -1222,4 +1222,9 @@ config GPIO_NXP_74HC153
  	  Platform driver for NXP 74HC153 Dual 4-input Multiplexer. This
  	  provides a GPIO interface supporting input mode only.
  

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/490-usb-ehci-add-quirks-for-qca-socs.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c
 +++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c
-@@ -252,6 +252,37 @@ int ehci_reset(struct ehci_hcd *ehci)
+@@ -253,6 +253,37 @@ int ehci_reset(struct ehci_hcd *ehci)
  	command |= CMD_RESET;
  	dbg_cmd (ehci, "reset", command);
  	ehci_writel(ehci, command, &ehci->regs->command);

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/500-MIPS-fw-myloader.patch

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  
 --- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
 +++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
-@@ -1152,6 +1152,9 @@ config MIPS_MSC
+@@ -1153,6 +1153,9 @@ config MIPS_MSC
  config MIPS_NILE4
  	bool
  

target/linux/ar71xx/patches-4.9/910-unaligned_access_hacks.patch

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@
  		case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
 +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
-@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ static void ip6gre_err(struct sk_buff *s
+@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ static void ip6gre_err(struct sk_buff *s
  		return;
  	ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
  	greh = (const struct gre_base_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
  	for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c
 +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
-@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_look
+@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_look
  	else if (skb)
  		pkey = &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
  
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@
  
 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
 +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-@@ -3926,14 +3926,16 @@ static bool tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(
+@@ -3935,14 +3935,16 @@ static bool tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(
  {
  	const __be32 *ptr = (const __be32 *)(th + 1);
  
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@
   * No flags defined yet.
 --- a/net/core/utils.c
 +++ b/net/core/utils.c
-@@ -321,8 +321,14 @@ void inet_proto_csum_replace16(__sum16 *
+@@ -338,8 +338,14 @@ void inet_proto_csum_replace16(__sum16 *
  			       bool pseudohdr)
  {
  	__be32 diff[] = {
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@
  		*sum = csum_fold(csum_partial(diff, sizeof(diff),
 --- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c
 +++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
-@@ -1800,15 +1800,15 @@ static int vxlan_build_skb(struct sk_buf
+@@ -1808,15 +1808,15 @@ static int vxlan_build_skb(struct sk_buf
  		goto out_free;
  
  	vxh = (struct vxlanhdr *) __skb_push(skb, sizeof(*vxh));

target/linux/armvirt/config-4.14

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL2=y
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG2=y
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_WORKQUEUE=y
 CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS=y
+CONFIG_DMADEVICES=y
 CONFIG_DTC=y
 CONFIG_EDAC_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_EXT4_FS=y