OpenWrt v21.02.7: adjust config defaults

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>

feeds.conf.default

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-src-git-full packages https://git.openwrt.org/feed/packages.git^0b7b12d7075637d3ce3c4eb22b74b2f6d3054672
+src-git-full packages https://git.openwrt.org/feed/packages.git^48242ee7a190db7740f7b9b3ef1debfa4d5857f6
 src-git-full luci https://git.openwrt.org/project/luci.git^e98243ef9eb838cca80cdd6d1bd0cf69a509d103
 src-git-full routing https://git.openwrt.org/feed/routing.git^8071852b4556a02533cacb7a0f6a432df3507302
 src-git-full telephony https://git.openwrt.org/feed/telephony.git^920fbc5c0a2e4badf51bceff42e9a1e3eb693462

include/version.mk

@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ PKG_CONFIG_DEPENDS += \
 sanitize = $(call tolower,$(subst _,-,$(subst $(space),-,$(1))))
 
 VERSION_NUMBER:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_NUMBER))
-VERSION_NUMBER:=$(if $(VERSION_NUMBER),$(VERSION_NUMBER),21.02.6)
+VERSION_NUMBER:=$(if $(VERSION_NUMBER),$(VERSION_NUMBER),21.02.7)
 
 VERSION_CODE:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_CODE))
-VERSION_CODE:=$(if $(VERSION_CODE),$(VERSION_CODE),r16842-bc99ce5b22)
+VERSION_CODE:=$(if $(VERSION_CODE),$(VERSION_CODE),r16847-f8282da11e)
 
 VERSION_REPO:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_REPO))
-VERSION_REPO:=$(if $(VERSION_REPO),$(VERSION_REPO),https://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/21.02.6)
+VERSION_REPO:=$(if $(VERSION_REPO),$(VERSION_REPO),https://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/21.02.7)
 
 VERSION_DIST:=$(call qstrip,$(CONFIG_VERSION_DIST))
 VERSION_DIST:=$(if $(VERSION_DIST),$(VERSION_DIST),OpenWrt)

package/base-files/image-config.in

@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ if VERSIONOPT
 	config VERSION_REPO
 		string
 		prompt "Release repository"
-		default "https://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/21.02.6"
+		default "https://downloads.openwrt.org/releases/21.02.7"
 		help
 			This is the repository address embedded in the image, it defaults
 			to the trunk snapshot repo; the url may contain the following placeholders:

package/libs/openssl/Makefile

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ PKG_NAME:=openssl
 PKG_BASE:=1.1.1
 PKG_BUGFIX:=t
 PKG_VERSION:=$(PKG_BASE)$(PKG_BUGFIX)
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
 PKG_USE_MIPS16:=0
 ENGINES_DIR=engines-1.1
 

package/libs/openssl/patches/200-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
+
+A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
+of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
+that include policy constraints.  Attackers may be able to exploit this
+vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
+exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
+(DoS) attack on affected systems.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-0464
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
+index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
++++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
+@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
+ };
+ 
+ struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
++    /* The number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_count;
++    /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_maximum;
++
+     /* This is the tree 'level' data */
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
+     int nlevel;
+@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                  X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                  X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
++                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                 int extra_data);
+ void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
+ int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
+                       const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
+diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
+index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
++++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
+@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                  X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                  X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
++                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                 int extra_data)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ 
++    /* Verify that the tree isn't too large.  This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
++    if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
++        return NULL;
++
+     node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
+     if (node == NULL) {
+         X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+     }
+     node->data = data;
+     node->parent = parent;
+-    if (level) {
++    if (level != NULL) {
+         if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
+             if (level->anyPolicy)
+                 goto node_error;
+@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (tree) {
++    if (extra_data) {
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
+             tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
+@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    tree->node_count++;
+     if (parent)
+         parent->nchild++;
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
++++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@
+ 
+ #include "pcy_local.h"
+ 
++/*
++ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
++ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
++ *
++ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
++ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
++ */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
++# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
+  * evaluation.
+@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+         return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
++    tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
++
+     /*
+      * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
+      *
+@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+     level = tree->levels;
+     if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
+         goto bad_tree;
+-    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         policy_data_free(data);
+         goto bad_tree;
+     }
+@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+  */
+ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
++                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
++                                    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+     int i, matched = 0;
+@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+ 
+         if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+-            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
++            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
+                 return 0;
+             matched = 1;
+         }
+     }
+     if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+-        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
++                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
++                           X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     int i;
+ 
+@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+ 
+         /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+-        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
++        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+     data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+     data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+-    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         policy_data_free(data);
+         return 0;
+     }
+@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     }
+     /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+     if (last->anyPolicy &&
+-        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+         return 0;
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+             extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
+             extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+                 | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+-            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
++            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1);
+         }
+         if (!tree->user_policies) {
+             tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ 
+     for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+         cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+-        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
++        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
+             return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+ 
+         if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)

package/libs/openssl/patches/210-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf
+ certs
+
+Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
+later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
+cert was bad.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
+
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+     }
+     /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
+-        int i;
++        int i, cbcalled = 0;
+ 
+         /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
+-        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
++        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+             X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ 
+             if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+                 continue;
++            cbcalled = 1;
+             if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+                                 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
+                 return 0;
+         }
++        if (!cbcalled) {
++            /* Should not be able to get here */
++            X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            return 0;
++        }
++        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
+         return 1;
+     }
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {

package/libs/uclient/Makefile

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ PKG_RELEASE=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
 PKG_SOURCE_URL=$(PROJECT_GIT)/project/uclient.git
-PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=7c443cac02a734dd312c65618f4de17248d188317f30a9fac192c1503b3d5c05
-PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2021-05-14
-PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=6a6011df3429ffa5958d12b1327eeda4fd9daa47
+PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=16c6c97f45d9737fb40628ea22ae347541a1e37d8d1576e04ffbaa5fc92f3b6d
+PKG_SOURCE_DATE:=2023-04-13
+PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=007d945467499f43656b141171d31f5643b83a6c
 CMAKE_INSTALL:=1
 
 PKG_BUILD_DEPENDS:=ustream-ssl

target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/430-v6.3-ubi-Fix-failure-attaching-when-vid_hdr-offset-equals.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 1e020e1b96afdecd20680b5b5be2a6ffc3d27628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 09:33:08 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] ubi: Fix failure attaching when vid_hdr offset equals to
+ (sub)page size
+
+Following process will make ubi attaching failed since commit
+1b42b1a36fc946 ("ubi: ensure that VID header offset ... size"):
+
+ID="0xec,0xa1,0x00,0x15" # 128M 128KB 2KB
+modprobe nandsim id_bytes=$ID
+flash_eraseall /dev/mtd0
+modprobe ubi mtd="0,2048"  # set vid_hdr offset as 2048 (one page)
+(dmesg):
+  ubi0 error: ubi_attach_mtd_dev [ubi]: VID header offset 2048 too large.
+  UBI error: cannot attach mtd0
+  UBI error: cannot initialize UBI, error -22
+
+Rework original solution, the key point is making sure
+'vid_hdr_shift + UBI_VID_HDR_SIZE < ubi->vid_hdr_alsize',
+so we should check vid_hdr_shift rather not vid_hdr_offset.
+Then, ubi still support (sub)page aligined VID header offset.
+
+Fixes: 1b42b1a36fc946 ("ubi: ensure that VID header offset ... size")
+Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
+Tested-by: Nicolas Schichan <nschichan@freebox.fr>
+Tested-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> # v5.10, v4.19
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+---
+ drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c
+@@ -644,12 +644,6 @@ static int io_init(struct ubi_device *ub
+ 	ubi->ec_hdr_alsize = ALIGN(UBI_EC_HDR_SIZE, ubi->hdrs_min_io_size);
+ 	ubi->vid_hdr_alsize = ALIGN(UBI_VID_HDR_SIZE, ubi->hdrs_min_io_size);
+ 
+-	if (ubi->vid_hdr_offset && ((ubi->vid_hdr_offset + UBI_VID_HDR_SIZE) >
+-	    ubi->vid_hdr_alsize)) {
+-		ubi_err(ubi, "VID header offset %d too large.", ubi->vid_hdr_offset);
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+-
+ 	dbg_gen("min_io_size      %d", ubi->min_io_size);
+ 	dbg_gen("max_write_size   %d", ubi->max_write_size);
+ 	dbg_gen("hdrs_min_io_size %d", ubi->hdrs_min_io_size);
+@@ -667,6 +661,21 @@ static int io_init(struct ubi_device *ub
+ 						ubi->vid_hdr_aloffset;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Memory allocation for VID header is ubi->vid_hdr_alsize
++	 * which is described in comments in io.c.
++	 * Make sure VID header shift + UBI_VID_HDR_SIZE not exceeds
++	 * ubi->vid_hdr_alsize, so that all vid header operations
++	 * won't access memory out of bounds.
++	 */
++	if ((ubi->vid_hdr_shift + UBI_VID_HDR_SIZE) > ubi->vid_hdr_alsize) {
++		ubi_err(ubi, "Invalid VID header offset %d, VID header shift(%d)"
++			" + VID header size(%zu) > VID header aligned size(%d).",
++			ubi->vid_hdr_offset, ubi->vid_hdr_shift,
++			UBI_VID_HDR_SIZE, ubi->vid_hdr_alsize);
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Similar for the data offset */
+ 	ubi->leb_start = ubi->vid_hdr_offset + UBI_VID_HDR_SIZE;
+ 	ubi->leb_start = ALIGN(ubi->leb_start, ubi->min_io_size);

target/linux/generic/pending-5.4/490-ubi-auto-attach-mtd-device-named-ubi-or-data-on-boot.patch

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
 
 --- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c
 +++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c
-@@ -1168,6 +1168,73 @@ static struct mtd_info * __init open_mtd
+@@ -1177,6 +1177,73 @@ static struct mtd_info * __init open_mtd
  	return mtd;
  }
  
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
  static int __init ubi_init(void)
  {
  	int err, i, k;
-@@ -1251,6 +1318,12 @@ static int __init ubi_init(void)
+@@ -1260,6 +1327,12 @@ static int __init ubi_init(void)
  		}
  	}
  

version

@@ -1 +1 @@
-r16842-bc99ce5b22
+r16847-f8282da11e

version.date

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1681043296
+1681737336